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FOREWORD
Mr. Henry Sokolski has written an excellent, short
book about what he sees as our not so peaceful nuclear
future. While short in length, it covers a lot of ground,
and because it is extensively footnoted, it can lead
readers to the broader literature.
The book provides a good picture of the growing stockpiles of separated plutonium and the stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium, as well as the likely
expansion of nuclear power programs in additional
countries. When reading the book, my thoughts turned
to the Per Bak book, How Nature Works, and the concept of self-organized criticality and its descriptions
of computer simulations and experiments leading to
avalanches in sand piles. This may be a useful way of
thinking about the possible consequences of nuclear
weapons proliferation as the stockpiles of fissile material grow. Also, as we think about the likelihood of
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should be
aware that developing nuclear weapons may be easier
as time passes and computing power increases, high
energy explosives improve, and diagnostic technology
advances.
Mr. Sokolski includes a discussion of the question:
Does it matter if more countries have nuclear weapons? He points out that a number of respected people
say it does not; some say it would be a more stable
world. Mr. Sokolski disagrees, and I am with him, for
two reasons. First, those who say it will not matter, I
believe, tend to assume that deterrence of attacks by
others is almost automatic. There is little discussion
of the vulnerability of the weapons, delivery systems,
command and central systems, and more. Having a
well-protected second-strike capability historically
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was not automatic; it took time and effort, changed
operational practices, etc. Second, the Russians have
been writing for at least the past 15 years of the need
they have for tactical nuclear weapons to defend their
large territory, because they say they do not have the
resources to defend conventionally. They call for a new
generation of nuclear weapons that would be easier to
use. They more recently have developed an interest in
the early use of tactical nuclear weapons to de-escalate
a conflict quickly.
If such use occurred, especially if it led to the successful de-escalation of a conflict on their borders, it
might be a trigger for an avalanche of proliferation—a
la Per Bak’s sand piles—a much larger avalanche than,
in the case of Iran, getting nuclear weapons, which has
been the subject of several studies in recent years. The
successful Russian use would be the first operational
use of nuclear weapons in many decades and would
revive consideration of the value of tactical nuclear
weapons. In any case, it is not clear that this would be
a very peaceful world.
The problems arising from the growing stockpiles
are addressed in the book and some ideas are put forward—a good start on how to limit the dangers that
may flow from that growth. The author raises important questions that deserve continued attention.

Andrew W. Marshall

x

PREFACE
It has been more than 3 years since the release of
the first edition of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful
Nuclear Future. Since then, Kim Jong-un has conducted
three nuclear tests, destroyed a nuclear test site, and
has pledged to President Donald Trump to denuclearize. Meanwhile, the United States agreed to a multilateral nuclear deal limiting Iran’s nuclear program and
then pulled out of the deal. Finally, President Trump
was elected and has been eager to question all aspects
of U.S. policy, including those related to national security and nuclear policy. Other important nuclear developments have occurred as well. These are all reflected
in the edits that have been made to this second edition.
My original decision to keep this publication open
source was sound. The aim of this book is to focus
and provoke discussion about how we should think
and act against the further spread of nuclear weapons
and their possible use. Work has already begun on the
third edition.

Henry D. Sokolski
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
It was curious and sad that after his death, Albert
Wohlstetter, a former professor of mine and a major
force in American strategic planning for nearly a
half-century, was criticized for not having written a
book. His apologia, albeit unspoken, was that he had
more important things to do: guiding U.S. and international policy, which he did effectively in so many
ways, including framing the debate over what should
be done about nuclear proliferation. His work, and
that of his wife and chief collaborator, Roberta Wohlstetter, are best understood through the many policy
and economic studies they wrote and the profound
impact they had on U.S. and allied security and energy
policies.1
Although I served 11 years in the Pentagon and as a
staffer on Capitol Hill, I have no such excuse. The clearest proof of this is this slim volume, the sequel to Best of
Intentions: America’s Campaign against Strategic Weapons
Proliferation.2 That volume was largely historical and
written in support of a graduate-level course I teach
on nuclear energy policy. The thinking behind Best of
Intentions was straightforward: Determining where we
are necessarily requires, first, familiarity with where
we have been. I wrote that volume because, at the time,
there was no critical history of nonproliferation available to dispatch my students in any practical direction.
As I continued to teach, though, I noticed another
gap in the literature. The arguments policymakers
and academics were making on how nuclear weapons
reductions related to preventing further nuclear proliferation were, at best, uneven. Each of the basic views—
arms control, hawkish, and academic—spotlighted
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some important aspect of the truth, but each was
incomplete and surprisingly optimistic.
The view most arms control proponents propound
is that any state that has nuclear weapons is obliged
to make further nuclear weapons reductions under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The superpowers promised to make such reductions, they contend, to get non-weapons states to accept intrusive
nuclear inspections and to abstain from acquiring
nuclear arms. Most who hold this view also believe
that nuclear weapons are only useful to deter others’
use of these weapons, that this mission can be accomplished with relatively few nuclear weapons, and that,
as such, we can make significant, additional strategic arms reductions at little or no cost to our national
security. Pursuing such reductions and strengthening
existing nuclear security measures also are desirable,
they argue, because nuclear weapons and their related
production infrastructures are vulnerable to unauthorized or accidental firings, terrorist seizure, sabotage,
and possible use.
Almost all of those holding these views argue that
states with advanced “peaceful” nuclear technology
are obliged to share it with non-weapons states as a
quid pro quo to get these states to uphold their NPT
nonproliferation pledges. Thus, civilian nuclear sharing, nonproliferation, and strategic arms reductions
are viewed as three equally critical “pillars” of an NPT
“bargain.”3
A second, more hawkish view rejects these positions, arguing that the link between nuclear reductions and proliferation is negative. Further significant
nuclear weapons cuts could well encourage America’s
adversaries to “sprint to nuclear parity.”4 Such efforts,
in turn, could easily spook Washington’s allies who

2

lack nuclear weapons (e.g., Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
South Korea, and Japan) to hedge their security bets by
acquiring their own. To avoid such proliferation, this
group contends that keeping or increasing U.S. nuclear
weapons capabilities (especially vis-à-vis China and
Russia) is our best bet.
Finally, some academics are skeptical of both these
views. They identify themselves as neorealists, and are
divided roughly into two camps—those who believe
that nuclear deterrence works, and those that do not.
Their disagreement here is significant but not as great
as what unifies their thinking—a shared disbelief in
there being any major link between nuclear weapons reductions, nonproliferation, and international
security.
Mainstream neorealists emphasize what they
believe to be the automaticity of nuclear deterrence.
They contend that the further spread of nuclear weapons is far less harmful to the world’s security than is
commonly assumed and that, because nuclear weapons are so effective in deterring wars, their further proliferation could actually help keep the peace.
A second and more recent neorealist school, though,
rejects faith in nuclear deterrence. It sees little military
value in nuclear weapons and concludes that their further spread is largely inconsequential. As for trying to
prevent proliferation, this newer school of neorealism
argues that this can be far more dangerous and provocative—they spotlight the invasion of Iraq—than letting
these weapons spread.5
Each of these views—arms control, hawkish, and
academic—is intellectually attractive. Each is concise.
All, however, are incomplete. None fully explore the
regional insecurities that arise with threatened nuclear
weapons breakouts or ramp-ups. Instead, they dwell
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on the security impacts of nuclear proliferation after
states have actually broken out or ramped up. Nor do
they have much to say about the significant overlaps
between civilian and military nuclear activities or the
risk that “peaceful” nuclear facilities or materials might
be diverted to make bombs. Instead, they focus almost
exclusively on nuclear weapons and their impact on
international security (albeit in differing periods).6
Finally, none adequately consider the discontiguous
view that fewer nuclear weapons in fewer hands is
desirable, but that rushing to achieve such reductions
without first getting key nuclear states to reduce in a
transparent, coordinated fashion could easily make
matters worse.
This brief volume covers each of these points. First,
it reviews the key popular views on nuclear proliferation. Second, it considers how much worse matters might get if states continue with relatively loose
nuclear constraints on civilian and military nuclear
activities. Finally, it suggests what might be done to
avoid the worst.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. See Robert Zarate and Henry D. Sokolski, eds., Nuclear
Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2009, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.
cfm?pubID=893.
2. See Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign
against Strategic Weapons Proliferation, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.
3. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Delegation to the 2010
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “The Three Pillars,”
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, pp. 4-6, available
from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf; Paul

4

K. Keer, Mary Beth Nikitin, Amy F. Woolf, and Jonathan Medalia, 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key Issues
and Implications, R41216, Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional
Research Service, May 3, 2010, pp. 1-15, available from http://fas.
org:8080/sgp/crs/nuke/R41216.pdf; and Wikipedia Contributors,
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, last modified October 6, 2014,
available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_NonProliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Treaty_.22pillars.22.
4. See Statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense,
“National Security Implications of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,” Hearing before the Committee on the Armed Forces,
Senate Hearing 107-806, Washington, DC, 107th Congress, 2nd
Session, July 25, 2002, available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/congress/2002_hr/rumsfeld725.pdf.
5. The best single work reflecting the views of the first camp is
Kenneth N. Waltz’s essay in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz,
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1995. The best work reflecting the views of the second
camp is John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from
Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
As for the arguments made about the human costs of war against
Iraq, there is no question that these were substantial. That the war
was fought primarily as a nonproliferation campaign, however, is
much more open to debate. See, Jamie McIntyre, “Pentagon Challenges Vanity Fair Report,” CNN, May 30, 2003, available from
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/30/wolfowitz.vanity.fair/.
6. The first school—the official arms control view—is both
incremental and relatively immediate in its outlook, activities,
goals, and approach. It generally views reaching any agreement,
even an interim one, as being favorable to reaching no agreement.
In contrast, hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons (as well as
hardheaded security planners who might not be as enthusiastic
about relying heavily on nuclear arms) generally focus on set
goals and encourage actions for the mid-term—i.e., for the next
10 to 20 years. Finally, academic skeptics who challenge these
other schools generally write as if their operational insights about
nuclear weapons and deterrence immediately pertain and are
permanent—i.e., immutable.
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CHAPTER 2. WHAT WE THINK
For the last half-century, the task of limiting
nuclear arsenals has been viewed as being related to,
but different from, preventing proliferation. Nuclear
arms restraints are “fostered” through nuclear weapons negotiations, agreements, and norms as well as
by states deploying “stable” strategic weapons forces—i.e., ones that can readily survive even if they are
struck first and that are themselves incapable of totally
destroying a key opponent’s nuclear forces in a first
strike. In contrast, one “fights” or “combats” the further spread of nuclear weapons by imposing export
controls, economic sanctions, international inspections, or conducting preventative and preemptive
military strikes and covert intelligence and military
operations.1 The most significant nuclear arms control
efforts historically have been undertaken by the most
heavily nuclear-armed states—principally the United
States and Russia. Preventing nuclear proliferation, in
contrast, is generally a global undertaking.
The Barack Obama administration is noteworthy among recent presidencies for consciously trying
to integrate U.S. nuclear arms control efforts with
nonproliferation. Following former U.S. President
Obama’s 2009 appeal to eliminate nuclear weapons
presented in Prague, Czech Republic, the U.S. Government made reducing nuclear arms a prerequisite for
preventing their further spread.2 If we expect other
nations to repress their own nuclear weapons aspirations, administration officials argued, the nuclear
superpowers had to demonstrate a greater willingness
to disarm themselves. Such disarmament was feasible, they insisted, because nuclear weapons were, in
their view, only useful to deter other hostile nuclear

7

weapons states. This basic mission, they argued, could
be accomplished with a relatively small stockpile of
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, maintaining
large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable fuels, they argued, only increased the prospects for instability, nuclear terrorism, and accidental
or illicit use.
Hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons have a
different view.3 They argue that reducing American
and Russian nuclear arms has little or no impact on
reducing others’ nuclear weapons activities or holdings (e.g., North Korea and Iran). Instead, reducing
America’s nuclear arsenal might only entice China
to build up to America’s current nuclear numbers
and encourage America’s key nonnuclear allies and
friends—e.g., South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey—to hedge their bets against decreasingly credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees by developing
nuclear weapons options of their own. Finally, they
argue nuclear weapons, especially in U.S. and allied
hands, have helped keep the peace, whereas letting
U.S. and allied nuclear arsenals decline quantitatively
or qualitatively only increases the prospects for war.4
A group of academic skeptics, who identify themselves as neorealists, also question if eliminating
nuclear weapons is critical to assure peace. Further
nuclear weapons proliferation may be inevitable they
argue, but it is unlikely to be destabilizing. A credible
nuclear deterrent force that holds several major cities at
risk, they insist, can keep the peace and need only be a
relatively small, “finite” force. The earliest proponents
of such “finite deterrence”―Pierre Gallois, his French
colleagues,5 Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, and other original supporters of the U.S. Polaris nuclear missile submarine fleet6 and, much later, Kenneth Waltz and his
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academic associates7―all emphasized what they saw as
the virtual automaticity of nuclear deterrence between
any two rival nuclear-armed states. With this, French
proponents of finite deterrence argued that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to smaller states
was more likely to prevent military aggression than to
prompt it. Central to their thinking was the disturbing
notion that credibly threatening to destroy an adversary’s major cities (what Charles de Gaulle referred to
as “tearing off an arm”8) would deter hostile actions by
other states, both large and small.
A more recent version of such thinking has been
made popular by scholars such as John Mueller. Mueller takes a different tack but reaches similar conclusions. He argues that nuclear weapons actually do a
poor job of deterring small or major wars.9 Citing the
popular scholarship of Ward Wilson,10 supporters of
this view contend that nuclear weapons were unnecessary to secure Japan’s surrender in 194511 or to
deter a third World War since North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact nations were
haunted by fears of suffering a yet deadlier conventionally armed version of World War II.12 Also, smaller
wars—e.g., the Israeli war of 1973 and the Korean
and Vietnam wars—Mueller notes, clearly were not
deterred by anyone’s nuclear weapons. Nor were the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) or the
terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008. The implication
is that nuclear weapons are so ineffective at deterring
aggression and their use is so unlikely that their further spread is not very consequential.13
Each of these schools―arms control, hawkish, and
academic―also differ on the impact and desirability of
sharing dual-use nuclear technology for civilian applications. Arms control proponents insist that nuclear
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supplier states have a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) obligation to transfer as much “peaceful” nuclear
technology to non-weapons states as possible so long
as it is for a declared civilian project that is internationally inspected. Failure to do so “without discrimination,” in their eyes, risks unraveling the NPT.14
Most hawks, on the other hand, object to civilian
nuclear cooperation with hostile states (e.g., Iran and
North Korea) but otherwise support the global expansion of civilian nuclear power. They certainly are willing to share such technology with close friends even
if such transfers might enhance existing or potential
weapons options (e.g., India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
South Korea, or Japan). As for the neorealists, some
have faulted nuclear nonproliferation policies for
unnecessarily inhibiting nuclear power’s beneficial
development domestically and overseas, but most
have no set view.15 Several have argued that letting
nuclear weapons spread to selected countries or sharing “nuclear capabilities” with them might bolster U.S.
security.16
For arms control advocates, then, the superpowers
must reduce their arsenals (“vertically”) to encourage
non-weapons states not to proliferate (“horizontally”).
Failure at this would risk instability or, worse, nuclear
use. Hawkish critics, meanwhile, believe that reducing
U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities is more likely to risk
nuclear proliferation and war than otherwise would
be the case if one augmented U.S. and allied strategic weapons capabilities or, at least, kept them from
declining. Finally, academic skeptics deny that vertical
reductions and horizontal nonproliferation are all that
closely linked and suggest that more nuclear weapons
in more hands may actually reduce the prospects for
war or, at the very least, that nuclear weapons and
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their proliferation are not all that significant (see figure
2-1).

Figure 2-1. Nuclear Proliferation: What We Think
RESERVATIONS
These three views on how nuclear weapons reductions and nonproliferation relate are clear, plausible,
and popular. They dominate the current debate over
nuclear weapons policies. There is only one problem:
in practice, none of them makes nearly as much sense
as their supporters think.
One can see this most readily by examining how
each school addresses the simplest and most popular of
policy questions: Should one be for or against nuclear
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weapons? Add to this question (for the purposes of
this inquiry) the matter of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the query admits to two simple answers—yes
(in support of nuclear weapons and additional proliferation) or no against both.
Let us take the against-side first. Those opposed to
nuclear weapons and their further proliferation—i.e.,
those who want to move toward zero nuclear weapons
as soon as possible—go to great lengths to explain why
a world without nuclear weapons is preferable to our
current world. They emphasize former U.S. President
Ronald Reagan’s observation that a nuclear war can
never be won and so should never be fought. They also
detail how a world with zero nuclear weapons might
work, and how one might prevent a relapse into a
nuclear-armed world once nuclear weapons have been
eliminated.17 This school of thought was also behind
the “Global Zero” campaign against nuclear weapons and the 2017 United Nations (UN) adoption of
the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,”
signed by 58 states but boycotted by the United States
and the other nuclear weapons states.18
Unfortunately, these same analysts are less articulate on how one might persuade existing nuclear weapons states to give up their weapons or how exactly one
would get to zero. So far, the United States and Russia
have reduced their nuclear holdings from over 70,000
deployed nuclear weapons19 to several thousand on
each side.20 This begs the question, though: How easy
would it be to reduce further to a few hundred warheads if other states (e.g., China, Israel, France, the
United Kingdom [UK], North Korea, Pakistan, or
India) acquired or deployed as many or more? Would
this not encourage increased military competitions,
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nuclear arms racing, miscalculation, and unnecessary
and potentially disastrous wars?
Securing clear answers to such questions, of course,
is difficult. Nonetheless, analysts backing zero nuclear
weapons offer a general picture of how things might
work. According to their narrative, the more the U.S.
Government increases its support for nuclear weapons
reductions and reduces its own arsenals with Russia,
the more likely other nuclear-armed states (e.g., China,
India, and Pakistan) would be to fall in line. To help
promote this more restrained nuclear future, the United
States and Russia, it is argued, should abandon plans
to deploy or defend their nuclear strategic forces in any
effort to achieve military advantage over one another
or other nations. Rather than aim their nuclear weapons against countless military targets, the superpowers
should adopt finite nuclear deterrence strategies that
would hold each other’s population and industrial centers at risk. Defending these cities and military assets
should also be eschewed in order to assure mutual
vulnerability. This would reduce the need for larger,
more accurate, quick-alert nuclear arsenals and make
deep cuts in existing nuclear stockpiles more feasible.
With increased nuclear restraint by the major nuclear
states, states lacking nuclear weapons would become
more willing to eschew nuclear weapons and support
nuclear nonproliferation.21 This is the upbeat narrative.
The downbeat narrative has us clinging to our
bombs. The more we maintain our nuclear stockpiles,
we are warned, the more it will undermine our claims
that we want to rely less on nuclear arms to assure our
security. This, in turn, risks encouraging other states to
acquire nuclear weapons (i.e., promoting more North
Koreas, Irans, and Pakistans), which will only strain
existing security relations and tempt America’s friends
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and allies (e.g., South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, etc.) to acquire nuclear weapons options of
their own.
Those backing nuclear reductions also offer historical analysis to challenge the presumed security utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms, they note, have
failed to deter important conventional wars (e.g., the
Korean or Vietnam wars or the Egyptian strike against
Israel in 1973) or terrorist attacks (e.g., 9/11 and the
Pakistani-backed terrorist strikes against targets in
India and Afghanistan).
Attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as
mere possession, also have prompted military strikes.
These included: Iran, Israel, and the United States
against Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1980, 1981,
1991, and 2002; Iraq against Iran’s reactor at Bushehr in
repeated attacks from 1984-88; Iraq’s failed Scud missile strike against Israel’s reactor at Dimona in 1991;
and Israel’s strike against Syria’s reactor in 2007. In
addition, attacks were seriously considered against
new nuclear states (e.g., the United States against the
Soviet Union in 1949 and the Soviet Union against
China in 1969).22 Bottom line: the possession and spread
of nuclear weapons generally undermines security.
For what, then, are nuclear weapons good? Only the
peculiar task of deterring other states from using their
nuclear weapons.
This last reflection, of course, is intended to further
demonstrate how little value nuclear weapons add and
why their early elimination is desired. This conclusion,
though, is triple-edged. Certainly, if nuclear weapons
truly are not valuable militarily, what is the urgency
to eliminate them? Some states held on to their horse
cavalries after World War I and their battleships long
after World War II, but that hardly encouraged their
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rivals to acquire them, and by mid-century these military instruments hardly posed a strategic threat to
anyone.
On the other hand, if nuclear weapons can effectively deter other nuclear-armed states, would that
not make their acquisition by non-weapons states all
but irresistible? The refrain of many security analysts
after the first Gulf war against Iraq was that the United
States would never have tried to remove former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein if he actually had the
bomb. In what way were they wrong?
Finally, is it reasonable to think that no one will
ever use nuclear weapons first? Do states that believe
in nuclear deterrence not presume that if they lacked a
survivable nuclear deterrent, their nuclear adversaries
might strike their or their allies’ vulnerable forces in an
attempt to gain some clear advantage? If so, would they
not constantly (and naturally) be worried that their or
their allies’ nuclear retaliatory capabilities might be
knocked out or be seriously degraded in a first strike
by their opponents? Would failing to attend to these
matters and merely making bluffs to retaliate against a
few targets of dubious military value (e.g., large population centers versus strategic weapons bases) not risk
making a hash of the whole notion of deterrence?23
If you allowed (as one should) that the answers to
these questions are, at least, unclear, you would expect
lengthy, heated debates about what the answers might
be. What is telling, however, is how little debate there
is. Instead, if these issues are raised at all, the subject of
conversation invariably is shifted to a much less contentious set of concerns—the horrors of nuclear theft,
nuclear accidents, unauthorized use, sabotage, and
terrorism. Focusing on these issues quickly brings one
to the desired conclusion (again) that the immediate
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reduction of nuclear weapons would immediately
make for a much safer world.24 In the interim, we
need to do all we can to increase security over existing
nuclear weapons assets and reduce the readiness and
numbers of deployed nuclear forces to head off these
possible threats.
Most of these nuclear security concerns are necessarily speculative. Neither accidental nor unauthorized
nuclear use has yet occurred. However, there is plenty
of near history (close calls of Russian, South African,
French, Chinese, and American nuclear launches,
tests, and thefts, Broken Arrow incidents, provocative nuclear tests, “lost” warheads, and nuclear weapons-usable materials gone unaccounted).25 As for
preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, though, such
efforts are entirely anticipatory. Specific and validated
intelligence regarding acts of nuclear terrorism so far
has gone wanting.26
Despite this (or perhaps because of it), addressing
these threats has become a public policy cause célèbre.
Today, nuclear terrorism is viewed by both Republican
and Democratic officials as the “most immediate and
extreme” threat facing America and the world.27 Billions of dollars are appropriated annually on questionable nuclear weapons detection and forensics efforts
and nuclear security and cooperative threat reduction
programs.28 Meanwhile, broad intelligence sweeps,
including of domestic phone and internet communications, have been justified, in no small part, to prevent
possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.29
Far less controversial are the international nuclear
security summits President Obama launched in 2009.
The fourth, held in Washington, DC, in 2016, allowed
scores of nations, including those acquiring or deploying nuclear weapons, to extol the virtues of keeping
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their nuclear weapons-related assets safe against seizure, sabotage, and illicit use. Details about how they
might accomplish this, however, were kept, as with
previous summits, to a minimum, lest hostile states
learn what might be needed to attack or seize these
holdings.
Although this set of nuclear security worries has
been spotlighted to maximize alarm, many who voice
them are nonetheless convinced that further progress
on nuclear arms control, which would eliminate most
of these problems, is inevitable. They celebrate the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
agreement and are enthusiastic about reaching further
unilateral and negotiated cuts as well as ratification of
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).30
They also remain steadfast in their belief that negotiated settlements can roll back Iran and North Korea’s
“aberrant” nuclear misbehavior. Yet, little is said about
other nuclear or near-nuclear weapons states. Instead,
there is self-congratulation in that former U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s earlier warnings that there
might be 20 or more nuclear weapons states by 1970
proved to be unfounded and insistence that pushing
more arms control is our best hope to eliminate the
remaining nuclear threat.31
What else must be pursued besides more START
negotiations and nuclear security summits? Three
things, all of which President Obama announced in his
2009 Prague speech: bring the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) into force and share “peaceful” civilian nuclear technology under appropriate
international safeguards. This roughly tracks the now
popular “three-pillar” view of the NPT—that to get
non-weapons states not to acquire nuclear weapons,
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the weapons states must reduce their nuclear arms and
offer more “peaceful” nuclear energy transfers.
Putting aside the improbability of the U.S. Senate
or Moscow backing the ratification of more significant
arms control agreements any time soon, accomplishing this agenda is practically impossible without the
unlikely support of states such as Iran, North Korea,
Pakistan, India, Israel, and Egypt. More important,
some of the objections to these agreements are not
merely political, but substantive.32
As for sharing “peaceful” nuclear technology and
disarming to secure continued nonproliferation, it
is difficult to see how such an approach can prevent
future Indias, Irans, Syrias, or North Koreas. Even if
one ignores how little of the NPT’s diplomatic history
actually supports today’s legalistic enthusiasm for the
“three-pillar” view,33 promoting this bargain is, at best,
problematic.
First, although encouraging nuclear weapons
restraint can indirectly support nonproliferation, it is
unclear how insisting on making nuclear disarmament
a legally binding quid pro quo for adopting sound
nonproliferation measures would work. In practice,
non-weapons states have held their adoption of nonproliferation measures hostage to the superpowers
doing more to disarm while their claim of insufficient
progress on this front gives them a diplomatic pretext
to threaten to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.
From a nuclear control perspective, none of this is
helpful. Backing off necessary nonproliferation controls only increases the prospects for more nuclear
weapons proliferation. This, in turn, is only likely to
increase demand for more nuclear armament.
Second, it is unclear how supplying non-weapons
states with the benefits of truly “peaceful” nuclear
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technology could assist in promoting more or tighter
nonproliferation controls. If the technology in question
is genuinely benign, by definition, it ought to be easy
to safeguard effectively against military diversions
and so be safe to share, free of any apprehensions it
might be diverted to make bombs. If, furthermore, the
nuclear item in question is profitable to sell, it is difficult to understand why nuclear supplier states would
need additional incentives, much less nonproliferation
ones, to share it.
On the other hand, if what was being sold is proliferation-prone (i.e., close and essential to bomb making)
and, therefore, dangerous to share, it is unclear why
any state eager to promote nuclear nonproliferation
would think it had an NPT obligation to transfer it.
Again, effective nuclear nonproliferation presumes
the sharing of only truly “peaceful” nuclear goods and
technologies—i.e., of nuclear items and know-how
that are so far from making bombs that attempts to
divert them for this purpose could be detected early
and reliably enough to intervene effectively to prevent
any weapons from ever being built. The alternative
would be that there is an NPT obligation to share dangerous nuclear technologies and goods that can bring
a non-weapons state to the very brink of acquiring
bombs. How much nonproliferation sense would that
make? The answer is all too clear.
This, then, brings us to hawks who object to such
wishful thinking—those who are “for” nuclear weapons. Their brief essentially is that nuclear weapons have
kept the peace. If you push for deeper nuclear reductions, they argue, it will do nothing to slow determined
proliferators from acquiring nuclear weapons.34 More
importantly, it could undermine our security alliance
system, which, in turn, would increase the risk that
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our friends and allies might go nuclear.35 All of this,
in turn, would only increase the prospects for war and
the possible use of nuclear weapons.
This line of argument, like that of the zero nuclear
weapons crowd, makes a number of sensible points.
Yet, it too is imperfect. First, as has already been noted,
we know that nuclear weapons have not deterred all
wars. Both North Korea and North Vietnam opposed
the United States in long-fought wars. Nor did U.S.
nuclear weapons deter China and Russia from lending
Hanoi and Pyongyang substantial military support.36
Then there is the Israeli war of 1973, when Israeli possession of nuclear arms may have changed the way the
war was fought (the United States finally came to Israel’s aid at the last moment for fear that the war might
go nuclear). However, Israeli nuclear weapons did
not prevent the war.37 Finally, it is unclear how, if at
all, nuclear weapons might deter nonstate actors from
engaging in terrorism—nuclear or nonnuclear.38
Perhaps the point is nuclear weapons have prevented some “major” (nuclear) wars or “major” defeats,
rather than all forms of military aggression. This seems
plausible. Certainly, the number of war casualties as
a percentage of the world’s population has declined
significantly since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.39
Yet, any “proof” of why something did not happen can
never be known with scientific certainty. As has already
been noted, a good number of security experts question if nuclear deterrence ever really “worked” during
the Cold War.40 Nor is the threat of nuclear escalation
the only possible explanation for why post-World
War II war casualties declined so much (smaller wars
usually follow large ones; post-war alliances were created and kept strong; military science improved; with
lower aiming inaccuracies, indiscriminate damage in
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war declined, etc.). These other explanations certainly
cannot be entirely discounted.
This, then, brings us to the second problem—this
argument’s lack of qualification. If one allows that
nuclear weapons have deterred major wars, what is
one to make of the observation? If some nuclear weapons have deterred some wars, would not more deter
more and would not more advanced (or, at least, an
ability to produce them quickly) deter even more?41
Would not this recommend increasing nuclear production capacities and resuming nuclear testing?42
Also, what of other states that lack such arms? Would
their acquisition of nuclear forces not help deter wars
as well? Might the further proliferation of weapons,
at least to our friends, then, be a good thing? Former
U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney argued that if China
failed to get North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons capabilities, it might well prompt Japan to acquire
nuclear weapons of its own. Current U.S. President
Donald Trump has argued that Japan and South Korea
will eventually go nuclear, and this may be good;
former British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson argues
that helping Iran get the bomb might bolster peace.
One also hears hawkish American support for Israel
maintaining its nuclear forces until there is peace in the
Middle East and for India to build its nuclear capabilities up to counter China’s nuclear forces.43
As logically consistent as these arguments may be,
they ought to cause unease. An unspoken assumption
is that nuclear deterrence will work perfectly (as it
supposedly did with Russia during the Cold War) and
that it can be counted upon to work perfectly forever
into the future. This is presumed, no matter how many
nuclear-armed states there might be, how rash or reckless these countries’ leaders are, or how vulnerable
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their forces might be to a first strike. It also presumes,
sub silentio, that the lack of truly disastrous nuclear
weapons accidents, unauthorized firings, acts of
nuclear terrorism, and thefts that we have experienced
so far is a permanent feature.44 All of this might well be
correct in the near and mid-term. Barring the adoption
of new, more effective nuclear restraints and security
controls that apply not just to the United States, but
also to other nations, it is difficult to believe such optimism is much more than a bet against the house.
Yet another unspoken premise at play is that smaller
nuclear weapons states and states eager to develop a
nuclear weapons option are merely “lesser included
threats.” The notion here is that if the United States can
deter or constrain Russia, the largest nuclear weapons
state, the United States and its allies are safe (or much
safer) against any other lesser nuclear-armed state.
This roughly was the message in the 2012 presidential election campaign when candidate Mitt Romney
described Russia as America’s number one geopolitical foe and the Obama administration defended the
primacy of working with Russia (versus China or
other smaller nuclear states) to limit America’s nuclear
arsenal. Russia is our most important strategic competitor.45 Deal with it, and you can deal with the others;
fail to neutralize Moscow, and you are unlikely ever to
prevail.46
Is this true? Russian President Vladimir Putin has
yet to explicitly threaten to destroy the United States.47
North Korea, however, has.48 If North Korea followed
through with its military threats against South Korea
or Japan (two states the United States is bound by
formal security agreements to defend), would that not
threaten a general war that the United States would be
loath to wage? What if Iran acquired nuclear weapons
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and deployed them to deter the United States and its
Gulf allies from countering Iranian conventional military aggression and covert actions against its neighbors? Such nonnuclear aggression could drive the
international price of oil to levels that could strategically weaken both the U.S. and most of the world’s
economies. Would nuclear strategic superiority over
Russia enable Washington to counter such concerns?
This set of questions brings us to the views of academic skeptics. As already noted, this school is split
into two camps. The first includes those who think
that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons may
be beneficial, that upon a state’s acquisition of nuclear
arms, effective nuclear deterrence is automatically
assured. The second includes those who question the
deterrence value of nuclear arms but who also believe
that preventing their proliferation is generally unnecessary or misguided.
What is appealing about the second group is its
willingness to take on those who extol the virtues of
nuclear deterrence. Did nuclear weapons force Japan to
surrender in World War II? No, Japan’s Emperor only
argued they did to save face in surrendering because he
knew Japan was destined for defeat by American and
Soviet conventional arms. Did they deter the Soviet
Union from invading Europe during the Cold War?
No, what kept the peace after 1945 was the creation of
effective East-West security alliance systems and the
very real fears these military alliances fostered; that of
a massive, conventional third World War if Cold War
diplomacy failed.
This second group of academics also offers thoughtful rejoinders to the conventional wisdom that nuclear
terrorism should be worry number one. Is the threat
of nuclear terrorism the most imminent and extreme
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security threat we face? Not really. There are good reasons why no acts of nuclear terrorism have yet taken
place, and these are likely to apply well into the future.
Building or stealing nuclear weapons is too large and
complex an operation for most terrorist organizations.
A terrorist team tasked to build or seize such weapons would have to worry about being penetrated and
betrayed to authorities. Certainly, the high levels of
trust and cooperation needed to pull off such efforts
would be difficult to maintain. Nor is it in the interest
of states that possess such weapons to let anyone but
the most trusted and loyal gain access to them.49
This pushback to what are now the most popular
views on nuclear deterrence and terrorism is edifying.
Yet, ultimately, one counterfactual on what might have
prevented an event (e.g., various post-World War II
wars) can hardly trump another. Nor do negative projections on nuclear terrorism top positive ones if only
because the future probability of events that have not
yet occurred cannot be known statistically. In the end,
all such projections are speculative.
Moreover, what the two skeptical academic camps
agree on—that the dangers associated with nuclear
weapons proliferation are exaggerated—is rebuttable.
First, they gloss over the serious military risks faced
by nations acquiring nuclear weapons. One can see
this most clearly by their inattention to the numerous
historical cases of preventive military actions taken
against states attempting to build their first bomb and
to serious plans countries have made to knock out the
nuclear capabilities of new nuclear weapons states.
In the first category are: the British campaign against
the Nazi-operated heavy water plant in Norway; Iran’s
air strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1980; Israel’s attack of the same reactor in 1981; Iraq’s repeated
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strikes against Bushehr between 1984 and 1988; America’s air strike against Iraq’s nuclear facilities and Saddam’s failed Scud missile strike against Israel’s Dimona
reactor in 1991; an American Tomahawk missile strike
against Iraq’s uranium enrichment plant at Zaafaraniyah; British and American strikes against a variety
of suspect Iraqi nuclear sites in 1998; Israel’s air strike
against Syria’s covert nuclear reactor in 2007; and U.S.
and Israeli covert and cyber attacks against Iran’s
nuclear program from 2006 to 2010.
Just as numerous are the occasions that states
planned or prepared to knock out the nuclear weapons
capabilities of their adversaries. The U.S. military gave
serious thought to using nuclear weapons to destroy
the Soviet Union’s nuclear complex in 1949 and China’s in 1964. It also made preliminary military preparations for attacking North Korea’s nuclear complex in
1994. The Russians, meanwhile, considered attacking
South African nuclear facilities in 1976 after detecting South African preparations to test. They even
asked the United States for assistance in making the
strike. In 1969, a major border dispute between China
and Russia went hot and Moscow seriously considered attacking China’s nuclear complex. Two years
before, Egypt threatened Israel’s production reactor at
Dimona. Israel and India, meanwhile, cooperated in
several schemes in the 1980s (one of which nearly was
implemented) to knock out Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facilities at Kahuta.50
Second, while most academic skeptics believe
nuclear weapons automatically deter aggression near
perfectly even in small numbers, others believe nuclear
weapons are militarily useless even if these weapons
are numerous and advanced. Because of this, academic
skeptics pay little attention to the security risks that may
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come with deep nuclear weapons reductions—i.e., the
transitions from nuclear plenty to zero—risks, which
are potentially serious.
Finally, academic skeptics tend to ignore or gloss
over the risks “upward” nuclear transitions present.
These dangers are three-fold. First, as the number of
nuclear weapons players increases, the gravity, complexity, and likelihood of ruinous nuclear incidents
may increase within states (e.g., unauthorized or accidental use, terrorist theft, irredentist seizure, etc.) and
between them (e.g., catalytic wars, misread nuclear
signaling, etc.). Second, and closely related, are the
numerous technical and managerial challenges each
nuclear state faces to make their nuclear forces robust
and survivable enough to have any hope of effectively
deterring attacks. These challenges are most severe for
new nuclear weapons forces but are hardly inconsequential for large, mature forces.51 Last, as the number
of states possessing nuclear forces increases to include
nations covered by nuclear security alliance guarantees, the continued viability and coherence of these
alliance systems are likely to be tested in the extreme,
increasing the prospects for war.52
OPTIMISTS ALL
Putting aside the close calls during the various
Cold War crises (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and the
possibility of the United States offering France nuclear
weapons to use in Vietnam), the nuclear brinkmanship
that has been conducted by India and Pakistan, and
the nuclear preemption and dares of the Israeli wars of
1967 and 1973, none of the cases noted earlier seem to
support the idea that nuclear proliferation is “inconsequential,” much less stabilizing.53 Just the opposite. Of
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course, until and unless there is nuclear use, there is
no proof in these matters. We cannot predict the future
with much certainty, and the causes of wars are always
complex. All we know is that the United States fired
nuclear weapons in anger on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the United States and Russia threatened to
use them several times during the Cold War, but that,
for some reason, since 1945, they have never been used.
It would be nice to believe that they never will be
used; but unfortunately, they may. Russia, Pakistan,
and North Korea are quite explicit about the advantages of using nuclear weapons first against their
adversaries.54 Some analysts also now believe China’s
“no first use” policies may be undergoing revision.55
All of these states, plus Israel, North Korea, and India,
are increasing or modernizing their nuclear arsenals. If
these states were followed by Iran, South Korea, Japan,
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), or Saudi
Arabia,56 the chances for nuclear miscalculations and
war would likely go up, not down.57
Again, it may well be, as one recent analysis suggested, that the prospects for war will decline as soon
as there is “symmetry” between any two nuclear
states. This conclusion, however, begs the question of
precisely when and how such “symmetry” might be
achieved or perceived by each party. This matters since
this same analysis concludes that without such nuclear
symmetry, the prospects for conflict are increased.58
Nor can we assume that the consequences of nuclear
use will be minor. Total industrial wars may no longer
be likely. However, this hardly precludes the possibility of “limited” nuclear conflicts.59 With advanced
societies’ newfound distaste for protracted wars has
come an increased intolerance for violence. America’s
security state reaction to 9/11 certainly suggests the
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public desire for security has reached a new all-time
high. A nuclear event almost anywhere, as a result, is
likely to prompt even more security (i.e., repressive)
governance. Think of the Orwell novel, 1984. For governments originally dedicated to the proposition of
enlightened self-rule, this should be a concern.60 At
the very least, it ought to inform our thinking about
nuclear weapons and their possible use.
Yet, those eager to go to zero ultimately do not
appear to be all that worried that states might intentionally use these weapons. Just the opposite. Most
nuclear abolitionists allow that nuclear weapons are
only useful to deter nuclear attacks and believe that
they do. For them, it would be irrational for states to
use nuclear weapons to secure military advantage.
Nor do they seriously consider that Russia, Pakistan,
North Korea, or China might be developing their
nuclear forces for purposes other than deterrence.
Their worries instead focus optimistically on the yet
unrealized threats of nuclear terrorism, accidental detonations, and unauthorized use. Finally, they are convinced that deeper U.S. nuclear reductions will prompt
others to follow suit and insist that, despite the not-sopeaceful past nuclear activities of India, Iraq, Iran,
Egypt, Turkey, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Syria, sharing more dual-use nuclear technology
will help strengthen the NPT.
Nuclear hawks, meanwhile, may fear that our enemies might use nuclear weapons but are cautiously
optimistic that the United States and its allies can be
made safe against such threats so long as the right
numbers of nuclear weapons of the right kind in the
right hands are on the ready. The United States and
its friends must be willing and able to knock out proliferators’ nuclear projects in a timely fashion through
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conventional military strikes and covert action. Regarding the nuclear security concerns of the abolitionists,
they are similarly upbeat: We have avoided accidental
and illicit use so far; with due diligence we can manage
this problem into the future.
Finally, academic skeptics are perhaps the most
optimistic of all. Further nuclear proliferation is either
good or at least not a worry. Nuclear weapons deter
nuclear wars completely or are so useless they never
will be used.
Each of our current views of nuclear proliferation,
then, ends up serving our highest hopes. The question is: Do they adequately address what we should
be most worried about? Do they deal with the possible military diversion of “peaceful” nuclear energy—a
dual-use technology likely to spread further? Do they
adequately address the perils of making nuclear cuts as
other states continue to maintain or increase their arsenals? Do they assume that if we maintain our nuclear
weapons force capabilities, we will forever deter the
worst? Do they fully consider the military risks states
run when they acquire their first nuclear weapon or
try to ramp up existing arsenals significantly? Can any
of them by themselves serve as a practical guide to
reduce the nuclear challenges we face?
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CHAPTER 3. WHERE WE ARE HEADED
With most of the world’s advanced economies
slowly creeping out of recession with heavy deficit
spending, allied support for increased defense spending is still uncertain1 and a major emerging Asian
power increasingly at military odds with its neighbors and the United States is attempting to view our
times as rhyming with a decade of similar woes—the
disorderly 1930s.2 Might we again be drifting toward
some new form of mortal national combat? Or, will
our future more likely mimic the nearly half a century
that defined the Cold War—a period in which tensions
between competing states ebbed and flowed but peace
mostly prevailed by dint of nuclear mutual fear and
loathing?
The short answer is: nobody knows. This much,
however, is clear: the strategic military competitions of
the next 2 decades will be unlike any the world has yet
seen. Assuming U.S., Chinese, Russian, Israeli, Indian,
French, British, Pakistani, and North Korean strategic
forces continue to be modernized and America and
Russia freeze or further reduce their strategic nuclear
deployments, the next arms race will be run by a much
larger number of contestants with highly destructive
strategic capabilities far more closely matched and
capable of being quickly enlarged than in any other
previous period in history.
LOOKING BACKWARD: THE PAST
HALF-CENTURY OF NUCLEAR COMPETITION
To grasp the dimensions of this brave new world,
one need only compare how capable states were of
striking their adversaries suddenly a half-century ago,
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with what damage they might inflict today. In 1962,
Washington and Moscow engaged in the most significant of Cold War nuclear confrontations over the
Soviet deployment of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba.
At the time, the United States had over 24,000 operationally deployed nuclear weapons. Russia had nearly
2,500 weapons. The other nuclear powers—the United
Kingdom and France—had an aggregate of no more
than 50 (with France possessing few, if any, deployed
nuclear weapons).3 The difference in nuclear weapons deployment numbers between the top and bottom
nuclear powers—a figure equal to at least three orders
of magnitude—was massive. America, moreover, was
clearly dominant.
In contrast, today, the United States has slightly less
than 2,000 deployed strategic and tactical nuclear warheads and Russia has roughly 3,500.4 India, Pakistan,
the United Kingdom, France, and Israel have 100 to 400
nuclear weapons each, and China may have anywhere
from between 190 to 900.5 Putting aside North Korea’s
nascent nuclear force (compare to France’s force of
1962), the difference in the numbers of nuclear deployments between the top and bottom nuclear powers,
then, has fallen at least two full orders of magnitude
and is projected to decline even further (see figure 3-1).
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Number

United Kingdom

Figure 3-1. From U.S. Strategic Dominance to a
Compressed Nuclear Crowd6
As tight as the nuclear deployments between the
world’s nuclear-armed states have become, the potential for this nuclear balance to shift quickly and dramatically is far greater than it was a half-century ago.
In 1962, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and France had militarized nearly all of the nuclear
weapons materials they had. They held little or nothing back in reserve. Nor could any of them militarize
significant civilian stockpiles of separated plutonium
or highly enriched uranium (HEU), as no such stockpiles were then available.
Today, things are different. First, the United States
and Russia alone can redeploy thousands of reserve
nuclear weapons and reconfigure stockpiled fissile
materials into tens of thousands of additional nuclear
weapons. Second, officials in Japan have publicly
allowed they have the means to militarize nearly 11
metric tons of civilian plutonium (i.e., enough to make
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more than 2,000 first-generation bombs)7 material
domestically.8
India, meanwhile, has many hundreds of bombs’
worth of separated reactor-grade plutonium on tap,
is planning to expand its capacity to produce more of
this material significantly over the next 3 to 10 years,
and has claimed to test a nuclear device using reactor-grade material.9 Third, China has produced tons
of nuclear material that it might yet militarize and is
considering building a civilian plutonium reprocessing plant that could produce over 1,500 bombs’ worth
of plutonium annually.10 In addition, Pakistan, Iran,
Israel, South Korea, and North Korea either currently
make, or are planning to produce such nuclear fuels
(see figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2. National Stockpiles of Separated
Plutonium11
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As for enriched uranium, the United States and
Russia each still easily have more than 10,000 crude
bombs’ worth of surplus weapons-grade uranium on
hand (see figure 3-3).

Figure 3-3. National Stockpiles of Highly
Enriched Uranium12
The amount China may have deployed in weapons
is unclear, but a conservative estimate of the HEU it
has produced is 16 metric tons—i.e., enough to make
roughly 800 first-generation implosion weapons.13
India, meanwhile, has enough highly enriched uranium stockpiled to make several hundred additional
crude nuclear implosion weapons, as do France and
the United Kingdom (again, see figure 3-3). As for the
future, both Japan and China plan to expand their uranium enrichment capacity. South Korea would like
to enrich uranium as well. As will be discussed, all of
these efforts are likely to be in excess of anything called
for commercially.
This, then, brings us to the next qualitative strategic
metric of interest―long-range missile delivery systems.
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In 1962, only the United States and the Soviet Union
had missiles capable of delivering a first-generation
nuclear weapon any distance. Today, 24 states do.14 To
be sure, many of these states only have theater-range
systems. Most of these states are in hotspots like the
Middle East, where missiles of such range are more
than sufficient to strike several neighbors.15 Meanwhile, the rest of the world’s nuclear-capable missile
states can target this same region with intercontinental
or medium-range systems.
As for the total number of nuclear-armed states,
this figure has increased as well. A half-century ago,
only the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and France had nuclear arms, and an overwhelming
number of these weapons were in the hands of the
United States (see figure 3-4).

Figure 3-4. Four Nuclear Weapons States in 1962
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Now, there are nine nuclear-armed states. Two—
the United Kingdom and France—are within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, to a limited extent, coordinate their nuclear weapons efforts.16
North Korea, meanwhile, is a state that the major
powers hope will give up its nuclear arms in negotiations. In this world, U.S. officials like to think that most
of the currently nuclear-armed states are either U.S.
allies or strategic partners (see figure 3-5).

Figure 3-5. How the United States Views
the World Today
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This world, however, may not last. Certainly,
Tehran, Iran, may yet militarize its nuclear holdings,
and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, South Korea,
and Japan must now all be viewed as possible near
or mid-term nuclear-weapons-ready states. Unlike
France, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom, these
post-Cold War nuclear-weapons aspirants may not
announce their acquisition of their first nuclear weapon
by testing it. Instead, they are likely to develop “peaceful” nuclear energy programs, as did Iran, India, Iraq,
and North Korea, and then move toward nuclear
weapons only when they conclude it is useful to do so.
Whether or not “safety” and nuclear stability in
this new world will be “the sturdy child of [mutual]
terror” (Winston Churchill’s description of Cold War
stability),17 remains to be seen. Certainly, the stool of
nuclear deterrence will have many more strategic legs
that could give way in many more surprising ways
than were possible a half-century ago (see figure 3-6).

Figure 3-6. Possible Proliferated Future
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WHAT MAY GO WRONG
As already noted, a fashionable rejoinder to such
broodings is to insist that all of these states will be
mutually deterred. Any intelligent state, it is argued,
should know that using nuclear weapons is militarily
self-defeating and that these weapons’ only legitimate
mission is to deter military threats. According to this
view, fretting about nuclear use and proliferation is
mistaken or overwrought.18
But is it? Can states deter military threats with
nuclear weapons if their actual use is universally
viewed as being self-defeating? Which nuclear-armed
states, if any, actually believe they are militarily useless? As noted earlier, the Russians and Pakistanis
clearly do not. Just the opposite, they have gone out
of their way to develop battlefield nuclear weapons
and plan to use them first to deter and defeat opposing
advanced conventional forces. As for the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom, all have studiously
refused to renounce first use. Israel, meanwhile, insists
that, while it will not be first to introduce nuclear
weapons in the Middle East, it will not be second.
This leaves North Korea—a wild card—and India and
China, whose declared no first use policies are either
unclear or under reconsideration.19
However, are the days of highly destructive wars—
nuclear or nonnuclear—not behind us? Certainly, with
the events surrounding September 11, 2001 (9/11), this
view has gained increasing support from a number of
U.S. and allied military analysts and pundits.20 Reflecting this outlook, the United States and its European
allies have turned several Cold War nuclear “survival”
bunkers into private real estate offerings or historical
tourist sites.21
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The problem is that at least two states have not
done so. U.S. intelligence agencies have determined
that Russia invested over US$6 billion to expand a
400-square-mile underground nuclear complex at
Yamantau, a full decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
This complex is burrowed deep enough to withstand
a nuclear attack, and is large enough and provisioned
sufficiently to house 60,000 people for months. U.S.
intelligence officials believe it is one of a system of as
many as 200 Russian nuclear bunkers (see figure 3-7).22

Figure 3-7. Russian Underground Nuclear Complex
at Yamantau23
China’s nuclear passive defense is no less impressive. In 2009, China’s strategic missile command, the
2nd Artillery Brigade, revealed that it had completed
3,000 miles of dispersed, deep, underground tunnels
for the deployment of its nuclear-capable cruise and
ballistic missile forces. China spent enormous sums to
build this system and is still expanding the complex,

58

known as the Underground Great Wall. The system
is said to be designed and provisioned to house thousands of military staff during a nuclear exchange (see
figure 3-8).24

Figure 3-8. China’s Underground Great Wall25
GOING BALLISTIC
All of this suggests that several nuclear-armed
states still believe they may have to endure or engage
in nuclear exchanges. Fortifying this suspicion is the
increasing capacity states have to deliver both nuclear
and nonnuclear payloads quickly against one another.
Back in 1962, only the United States and Russia had
nuclear-capable missile systems—i.e., cruise or ballistic missile systems capable of delivering a first-generation nuclear warhead (weighing 500 kilograms) 300
kilometers or farther.26 Now, no fewer than 24 countries have perfected or acquired such systems, and
nine can launch a satellite into orbit—i.e., have mastered all that is needed to deploy an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). In addition, the United States,
China, Iran, South Korea, Israel, and key NATO states
are all working on precision conventional missiles
capable of knocking out large military bases and major
59

naval surface combatants that, only a few decades ago,
were difficult or impossible to destroy without using
nuclear weapons.27 More nuclear-capable missile states
are likely to emerge (see figure 3-9).

Figure 3-9. Nuclear-Capable Missile Countries
Today28
The strategic uncertainties these missile trends can
generate are difficult to exaggerate. First, the proliferation of long-range missiles allows many more countries to play in any given regional dispute. One way
to measure a state’s diplomatic potential to influence
others militarily is simply to map out the range arcs of
its deployed missiles. Today, increasingly, these arcs
and the diplomatic-political “power” shadows they
cast overlap. Consider Iran: its missiles now target
Israel, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia,
Pakistan, France, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United
Kingdom.
This is a very different world than that of a half-century ago. In 1962, when alliance loyalties within the
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Communist and Free World Blocs were at their height,
only Russia and America had missiles aimed at each
other. Now, there is no Communist Bloc, what remains
of the Free World alliance system (e.g., NATO; Australia, New Zealand, the United States Security Treaty
[ANZUS]; etc.) is relatively weak, and nuclear-capable
missiles in hotspots like the Persian Gulf could be fired
from any number of states—both near and far. For
nuclear-armed states, this situation places a premium
on protecting their nuclear weapons-related systems
against surprise attack.29 It also raises first-order questions about nuclear escalation, which brings us to the
second reason more missiles in more hands is a major
worry: these missiles also can act as conventional catalysts for nuclear wars.
Increasingly, with precision guidance and advanced
munitions technologies, it is possible to destroy targets that once required nuclear weapons—e.g., large
air strips and air fields, command centers, naval ports,
and even large, moving surface ships—with a handful
of precise, conventionally-armed missiles instead. This
has raised the prospect of states being able to knock
out a significant portion of an opponent’s key military
forces without having to use nuclear weapons.30
The good news is that this should make the initial use of nuclear weapons less likely. The bad news
is that with enough precision guidance capabilities, a
state might be tempted to initiate combat in the expectation of winning without ever having to go nuclear
and end up miscalculating badly.
WAR SCENARIOS
A real-world case, much discussed by Pakistani
security analysts, is the mid-term prospect of an Indian
conventional missile decapitation of Pakistani nuclear
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strategic command and control centers. The Indians,
in this scenario, would use precise, offensive, longrange missiles to destroy these centers. Then, New
Delhi could deter any remaining Pakistani retaliatory
nuclear strike with India’s much larger nuclear forces
and with Indian nonnuclear missile defenses. Finally,
India could prevail against Pakistani armor and artillery, with superior Indian military conventional forces.
To hedge against this prospect, Pakistan ramped
up its nuclear arms production and is deploying its
nuclear weapons in ways designed to complicate
Indian efforts to destroy them (e.g., delegation of
launch authority under certain circumstances, forward
deployment, dispersal, mobility, etc.). All of these
methods only increase the prospects for nuclear use
and have goaded India to develop new nuclear options
of its own.
Beyond this, advanced conventional weapons
might ignite a nuclear conflict directly. Again, consider
India and Pakistan. After being targeted by so many
Pakistani-backed terrorist attacks, the Indian Government has developed a conventional counterstrategy
known as “Cold Start.” Under this approach, India
would respond to Pakistan-backed terrorist attacks by
quickly seizing a limited amount of Pakistani territory
with quick alert, forward deployed Indian forces (i.e.,
that could launch from what Indian military planners
call a “cold start”). The idea here would be to threaten
to take a limited amount of territory that Pakistan
holds dear, but not enough to prompt Pakistan to
attack India with its nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, India’s adoption of its Cold Start
plan has had nearly the reverse effect. Shortly after
New Delhi broached this strategy, Pakistani military
officials announced their intent to use tactical nuclear
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weapons against any invading Indian force and
deployed new, short-range nuclear-capable tactical
missiles along the Pakistani-Indian border precisely
for this purpose. India has responded by deploying
tactical missiles of its own. It is unclear just how serious either India or Pakistan are about carrying out
these war plans, but this uncertainty is itself a worry.31
Of course, relying on nuclear weapons to counter
conventional threats is not unique to Pakistan. Moscow,
faced with advanced Chinese and NATO conventional
forces, has also chosen to increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. For Russia, employing these
weapons is far less stressful economically than trying
to field advanced conventional forces and is militarily
pragmatic, given Russia’s shrinking cohort of eligible
military servicemen. China, in response, may be toying
with deploying additional tactical nuclear systems of
its own.32
CHINA AND THE NUCLEAR RIVALRIES AHEAD
All of these trends are challenging. They also suggest what the next strategic arms competition might
look like. First, if the United States and Russia maintain or reduce their current level of nuclear weapons deployments, it is possible that at least one other
nuclear weapons state may be tempted to close the gap.
Of course, in the short- and even mid-term, Pakistan,
Israel, and India could not hope to catch up. For these
states, getting ahead of the two superpowers would
take great effort and at least one to three decades of
continuous, flat-out military nuclear production. It is
quite clear, moreover, that none of these states have
set out to meet or beat the United States or Russia as a
national goal.
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China, however, is a different matter. It clearly sees
the United States as a key military competitor in the
Western Pacific and in Northeast Asia. China also has
had border disputes with India and historically has
been at odds with Russia as well. It is not surprising,
then, that China has actively been modernizing its
nuclear-capable missiles to target key U.S. and Indian
military air and sea bases with advanced conventional
missiles, and is developing missiles that are even more
advanced to threaten U.S. carrier task forces on the
open seas. In support of such operations, China is also
modernizing its military space assets, which include
military communications, command, surveillance,
and imagery satellites and an emerging antisatellite
capability.33
Then there is China’s nuclear arsenal. For nearly 30
years, most respected Western security analysts have
estimated the number of deployed Chinese nuclear
warheads to be between 190 and 300.34 Yet, by any
account, China has produced enough weapons-usable
plutonium and uranium to make up to four times this
number of weapons. Why, then, have Chinese nuclear
deployments been judged to be so low?
First, China has experienced first-hand what
might happen if its nuclear weapons fell into the
wrong hands. During the Cultural Revolution, one
of its nuclear weapons laboratories test fired a nuclear-armed medium-range missile over heavily populated regions of China and exploded the device. Not
long after, Mao Zedong ordered a major consolidation
of China’s nuclear warheads and had them placed
under much tighter centralized control. Arguably, the
fewer nuclear warheads China has, the easier it is for
its officials to maintain control over them.35
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Second, and possibly related, is China’s declared
nuclear weapons strategy. In all of its official military
white papers since 2006 and in other forums, Chinese
officials insist that Beijing would never be first to use
nuclear weapons and would never use them against
any nonnuclear weapons state. China also supports
a doctrine that calls for a nuclear retaliatory response
that is no more than what is “minimally” required for
its defense. Most Western Chinese security experts
have interpreted these statements to mean that Beijing
is interested in holding only a handful of opponents’
cities at risk. This, in turn, has encouraged Western officials to settle uncertainties regarding Chinese nuclear
warhead numbers toward the low end.36
What China’s actual nuclear use policies might be,
though, is open to debate. As one analyst quipped,
with America’s first use of nuclear weapons against
Japan in 1945, it is literally impossible for any country other than the United States to be first in using
these weapons. More important, Chinese officials
have emphasized that Taiwan is not an independent
state and that under certain circumstances, it may be
necessary for China to use nuclear weapons against
this island “province.” In addition, there are the notso-veiled nuclear threats that senior Chinese generals
have made against the United States if it should use
conventional weapons against China in response to a
Chinese attack against Taiwan (including the observation that the United States would not be willing to risk
Los Angeles to save Taipei).37
Finally, as China deploys more land-mobile and
submarine-based nuclear missile systems, there will be
increased technical and bureaucratic pressures to delegate more launch authority to each of China’s military
services. China’s ballistic missile submarines already
have complete nuclear systems under the command of
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their respective submarine captains. As China deploys
ever more advanced road-mobile nuclear missiles,
their commanders may want to have similar authority. Historically, in the United States and Russia, such
delegation of launch authority came with increased
nuclear weapons requirements.38
The second cause for conservatism in assessing
China’s arsenal is the extent to which estimates of the
number of Chinese warheads have been tied to the
observed number of Chinese nuclear weapons missile
launchers. So far, the number of these launchers that
have been seen has been relatively low. Moreover, few,
if any, missile reloads are assumed for each of these
missile launchers and it is presumed only a handful
of China’s missiles have multiple warheads. The numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons, such as nuclear
artillery, are also presumed to be low or nonexistent.
All of this may be right, but there are reasons to
wonder. The Chinese, after all, claim that they have
built 3,000 miles of tunnels to hide China’s nuclear-capable missile forces and related warheads and that
China continues to build such tunnels. Employing missile reloads for mobile missile systems has been standard practice for Russia and the United States. It would
be odd if it were not also a Chinese practice, particularly given China’s growing number of land-mobile
solid-fueled rocket and cruise missile systems. With
China’s recent development of the DF-41, a massive,
mobile, nuclear-armed ICBM, and its deployment
of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on its silo-based DF-5s, U.S. authorities
believe China is deploying a new generation of MIRV
missiles.39 As already noted, several experts believe
China may be considering battlefield artillery for the
delivery of tactical nuclear shells.
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Number

Precisely how large is China’s nuclear arsenal,
then? The answer is unclear. The Chinese say they are
increasing the size of their nuclear weapons arsenal
“appropriately.”40 They have not yet said by how much.
General Viktor Yesin, the former chief of Russia’s strategic rocket forces, told U.S. security experts in 2012
that China may have more than 900 deployed nuclear
weapons and another 900 nuclear weapons stored in
reserve.41 This estimate, which is roughly seven times
greater than most analysts believe Beijing possesses,
would give China roughly as many warheads as the
United States currently has deployed.42
Putting aside how accurate this Russian projection
might be, the first problem it and other larger estimates
present is how sound long-term U.S. and Russian strategic plans might be. It hardly is in Washington’s or
Moscow’s interest to let Beijing believe it could threaten
Taiwanese, Japanese, American, Indian, or Russian
targets conventionally because China’s nuclear forces
were so large Beijing could assume they would deter
any of these states from ever responding militarily (see
figure 3-10).

Figure 3-10. The Next Decade: Nuclear Weapons
Uncertainties43
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Yet another question that a much larger Chinese
nuclear strategic force would raise is how it might
affect future U.S.-Russian strategic arms negotiations.
As China has increased its deployments of highly precise, nuclear-capable missile systems, Moscow has
chaffed at the missile limits that the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty imposes on its fielding
similar systems. Since the conclusion of New START
in 2011, Moscow has balked at making any further cuts
unless China is included in the negotiations. Shortly
after several U.S. security analysts and Members of
Congress spotlighted Russian moves to break out of
the INF Treaty,44 the State Department announced
that Russia, in fact, had violated the treaty.45 American
hawks, meanwhile, have warned against the United
States making further nuclear cuts lest other states,
like China, quickly ramp up their force levels to meet
or exceed ours. Yet, U.S. President Donald Trump has
voiced a desire to do so.46 All of this suggests the imperative for Washington and Moscow to factor China into
their arms control and strategic modernization calculations. The question is how.
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
Unfortunately, getting a sound answer to this question is not possible without first considering the security concerns of states other than the United States,
Russia, and China. Japan, for one, is an interested
party. It already has roughly 2,000 weapons’ worth of
separated plutonium on its soil. This plutonium was
supposed to fuel Japan’s light water and fast reactors, a
fleet that, before the accident at Fukushima, consisted
of 54 reactors. After the accident, Japan shut down all of
these plants, decided to reduce its reliance on nuclear
power as much as possible, and is projected in the
mid-term to bring no more than one-third of its light
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water reactor fleet back online.47 Meanwhile, Japan’s
fast reactor program has been effectively frozen since
the 1990s due to a series of accidents. Japan, the United
States, and France plan on cooperating on a renewed
effort, but it is unlikely that a new fast reactor will be
operating in Japan for decades.48
A related and immediate operational question is
whether Japan will bring a US$20-billion-plus commercial nuclear spent-fuel reprocessing plant capable of
producing roughly 1,500 bombs’ worth of plutonium a
year at Rokkasho online sometime in the spring of 2021.
This plutonium recycling effort has been controversial.
The original decision to proceed with it was made by
former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and can be
tied to Japanese considerations of developing a plutonium nuclear weapons option. Although this plant
is not necessary for the management of Japan’s spent
fuel, the forward costs of operating it could run as high
as US$100 billion. It is expected to produce 8 tons of
weapons-usable plutonium annually—enough to produce nearly as many first-generation nuclear weapons
as is contained in America’s entire deployed nuclear
force (see figure 3-11).49

Figure 3-11. Japanese Plutonium Stocks and
Projected Production50
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In light of the questionable technical and economic
benefits of operating Rokkasho, it would be difficult
for Tokyo to justify proceeding with this plant’s operation unless it wanted to develop an option to build
a large nuclear weapons arsenal.51 Given Japan currently retains nearly 11 tons of mostly reactor-grade
plutonium on its soil, enough to make roughly 2,000
first-generation nuclear warheads, there is no immediate need to bring Rokkasho online to assure a military
nuclear option.
However, Japan says it is committed to eliminating
this surplus plutonium stockpile and recently surrendered roughly 800 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to the United States in pursuance
of this stated goal.52 In this context, keeping Rokkasho
on the ready could be seen as a national security insurance policy. Some leading Japanese figures clearly see
it in this light,53 and technically, there is little question that the plutonium could be used to make effective weapons.54 In this regard, even under a much less
nationalistic, pro-nuclear government than the one
now in office, Japan’s National Diet in the fall of 2012
felt compelled to clarify in law that the purpose of the
country’s atomic energy program included supporting
Japan’s “national security.”55 Many nuclear observers
outside of Japan saw this as a not-so-veiled reference
to Japan’s “civilian” plutonium-fuel cycle program.
Certainly, South Korean and Chinese officials and
commentators spotlighted this prospect with concern.56
Their apprehensions, then, raise the questions: What
might happen if Japan ever decided to open Rokkasho?
How could this avoid stoking South Korean ambitions
to make their own nuclear fuels? What of China’s longterm efforts to modernize its own nuclear weapons
systems and its “peaceful” scheme of building a copy
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of Rokkasho itself? Would starting up Rokkasho not
catalyze these efforts? What if Japan’s startup of Rokkasho came after some Chinese or North Korean military provocation? Might this not trigger an additional
round of Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean
military and nuclear hedging actions?57
Yet another “peaceful” East Asian nuclear activity
that bears watching is the substantial plans both Japan
and China have to enrich uranium. Both countries justify these efforts as being necessary to fuel their light
water reactor fleets. There are several difficulties with
this argument, though. First, both countries already
have access to foreign uranium enrichment services
that are more than sufficient to supply current demand.
Second, any effort to become commercially self-sufficient in enriching uranium in the name of “energy
independence” is questionable for Japan and China,
given their lack of economic, domestic sources of highgrade uranium ore.
Even assuming China could stop importing enrichment services, as it now does from URENCO of Europe
and Minatom/Tenex of Russia, then it still would want
to import much of its uranium ore from overseas. Of
course, operating a commercial enrichment capacity
could afford a bargaining advantage to secure cheaper
foreign enrichment service contracts. In China’s case
(and Japan’s and South Korea’s cases as well), such
advantage can be had at enrichment capacities far
below those they have or want to acquire. Again, both
uranium ore and enrichment services are readily available globally at reasonable prices and are projected to
remain so. Uranium yellowcake spot prices are currently at historic lows. As for enrichment services, the
world’s current surplus of enrichment capacity is projected to persist at least through 2035.58 In short, there

71

is no lack of enrichment services internationally and,
given China’s access to Russian and European enrichers, there is little or no immediate economic imperative
for building more.
China, however, sees things differently. It currently has enough capacity to fuel a dozen large reactors and is building more than enough centrifuges to
fuel 58 gigawatts of nuclear capacity, optimistically
projected to be online by 2020.59 Some of this projected
capacity may be set aside for possible reactor exports
beyond those China is making to Pakistan. Yet, again
given the foreign enrichment services glut, none of this
enrichment expansion makes economic sense. What is
all too clear, however, is just how much of a military
option this enrichment capacity affords. By 2020, China’s planned enrichment capacity could fuel all of its
planned civilian reactors and still produce additional
material sufficient for more than 1,500 nuclear weapons a year.60
Japan’s enrichment plans differ only in scale. Like
China, it too lacks economic, domestic sources of highgrade uranium ore. As for Tokyo’s current enrichment capacity, it can fuel about eight reactors a year. If
Japan used all of this enrichment capacity for military
purposes, it could make roughly 4,500 kilograms of
weapons-grade uranium annually—enough to make
at least 200 first-generation nuclear weapons.61 Japan
plans to upgrade its uranium enrichment centrifuges.
The question, in light of the global surplus of commercial uranium enrichment capacity, though, is why (see
figure 3-12).
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Figure 3-12. Current and Projected East Asian
Uranium Enrichment Capacities62
As noted, China or South Korea agree with none of
these Japanese nuclear fuel-making activities and
plans. Seoul, in a not so well-disguised security hedge,
began to press Washington in 2009 for permission to
separate “peaceful” plutonium from U.S.-origin spent
fuel and to enrich U.S.-origin uranium in South Korea.
These requests coincided with several other South
Korean security-related demands. The first came after
North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. South Korean Parliamentarians asked the United States to redeploy
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil.
Washington refused.63 Then Seoul pushed Washington to extend the range of its nuclear-capable missiles
from 300 to 800 kilometers, and be practically freed
from range limits on its cruise missile and space satellite launchers. Washington relented.64 As for South
Korea’s nuclear demands, Seoul is likely to continue to
press its case.65
The question is what is next? Will Japan start Rokkasho as planned in 2021? What commercial nuclear
fuel making activities, if any, might Washington allow
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South Korea and China to engage in?66 Will North
Korea or China continue to engage in provocations
that will increase Japanese or South Korean demands
for more strategic military independence from their
American security alliance partner?
The two popular rejoinders to these questions are
that there is no reason to worry. Most experts insist
that neither Japan nor South Korea would ever acquire
nuclear weapons. The reasons, they argue, are simple.
It would not only undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime that they have sworn to uphold and
strengthen, but it would also risk their continued security ties with their most important ally, the United
States.
Perhaps; but when South Korea first doubted its
American security guarantees in the 1970s, it tried to
get nuclear weapons.67 Those doubts continue today
as North Korea builds up its nuclear and nonnuclear
forces against the South.68 On May 29, 2014, South
Korea’s president noted that, if North Korea tested
another nuclear weapon, it would be difficult “to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area.”
This would be a clear warning to not only North Korea,
but also the United States and China, that, if they fail to
prevent Pyongyang from further perfecting its nuclear
force, Japan and South Korea might well acquire
nuclear weapons of their own.69 After Pyongyang conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, South
Korean and Japanese politicians commented on the
legality and desirability of developing nuclear weapons options.70 They repeated these points when Pyongyang tested its fifth device later in 2016.71
Yet another optimistic view argues that it may
actually be in Washington’s interest to let Japan and
South Korea go nuclear. Letting them arm might actually tighten U.S. relations with these key allies, while
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reducing what the United States would otherwise have
to spend for their protection. Implicit to this argument
is the hope that neither Seoul nor Tokyo would feel
compelled to acquire many weapons—i.e., that like the
United Kingdom, they would eagerly integrate their
modest nuclear forces with that of America’s larger
force, share their target lists with Washington, and that
Washington would do likewise with them (as Washington already has with London).72
Again, this is plausible. However, it is worth noting
that Japan and South Korea are not the United Kingdom. Early on, the United Kingdom understood its
nuclear weapons efforts would ultimately be subordinate to and in the service of maintaining its “special
relationship” with Washington (and scaled down its
nuclear efforts accordingly). With the Japanese and
South Koreans, though, their nuclear efforts would
unavoidably be seen as a vote of no confidence in Washington’s nuclear security guarantees. As such, these
efforts would have to deal with demands by nationalists eager to build a truly independent nuclear force of
much more ambitious dimensions.73 More important
(and more likely), even if Japanese and South Korean
officials wanted to keep their forces subordinate to
those of the United States, they might still be driven to
acquire larger nuclear forces of their own to deal with
the likely military reactions of China, North Korea,
and other nuclear states.74
Consider the action-reaction dynamic that Seoul or
Tokyo going nuclear might set into motion with Beijing and Pyongyang. Presumably, in all cases (China
included), each state would try to protect its strategic
forces against possible attacks by building more passive defenses (hardening, mobilizing, tunneling, etc.).
They also would focus on building up their offensive
forces (both nuclear and nonnuclear) so they might
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eliminate as much of each other’s strategic forces at sea
and on land as soon as any war began (this to limit
the damage they would otherwise suffer). Finally, they
would increase the number of nuclear weapons assets,
missile portals, and other strategic aim points to prevent any of their adversaries from thinking they could
“knock out” their retaliatory forces. This, roughly, is
what unfolded during the Cold War rivalry between
Washington and the Soviet Union. As was the case for
Russia and the United States then, maintaining one’s
relative nuclear position could easily drive up East
Asian nuclear weapons requirements well beyond
scores or even hundreds of weapons.75
Potentially catalyzing this rivalry further are the
actions China’s immediate nuclear neighbors might
take. As has already been noted, the Russians are
unlikely to reduce their nuclear weapons deployments
if the Chinese increase theirs. As for India, it already
has roughly 100 nuclear weapons and many hundreds
of bombs’ worth of separated reactor-grade plutonium
it claims it can fashion into nuclear weapons. It is hedging its nuclear bets even further with plans to build
six unsafeguarded plutonium-producing breeder reactors by 2030 and an enrichment plant that may double
its production of weapons-grade uranium.76 Late in
2011, India announced it was working with Russia to
develop a terminally guided ICBM in response to Chinese medium-range ballistic missile deployments near
India’s borders.77
New Delhi has also pushed the development of a
nuclear submarine force, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM), missile defenses, long-range cruise
missiles, and improved strategic command and control
and intelligence systems. India is not yet competing
with China weapon-for-weapon. However, if China
were to increase its nuclear weapons deployments
76

significantly, Indian leaders might argue that they
had no other choice but to increase their own nuclear
holdings.
This then brings us back to Pakistan. It has done
all it can to keep up with India militarily. Since Islamabad is already producing as much plutonium and
highly enriched uranium as it can, it would likely seek
further technical assistance from China and financial help from its close ally, Saudi Arabia. Islamabad
may do this to hedge against India, whether China or
India build their nuclear arms up or not. There is also
good reason to believe that Saudi Arabia may want
to cooperate on nuclear weapons-related activities
with Pakistan or China to help Saudi Arabia hedge
against Iran’s growing nuclear weapons capabilities. It
is unclear if either China or Pakistan would actually
transfer nuclear weapons directly to Saudi Arabia or
choose instead to help it merely develop aspects of a
“peaceful” nuclear program, including reprocessing
and enrichment. They might do both.78
In this regard, Saudi Arabia has made it known
that it intends to build up its “peaceful” nuclear energy
capabilities and will not forswear its “right” to enrich
uranium or to reprocess plutonium.79 This would constitute one of the most lucrative, best financed near and
mid-term nuclear power markets in the world. The
reactors Saudi Arabia might build also could serve as
the basis for development of a major nuclear weapons
option. As Saudi Arabia’s former head of intelligence
told NATO ministers, the kingdom would have to get
nuclear weapons if Iran did.80 Further underscoring
this point, during a March 2018 visit to Washington,
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated
that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia
would do so as well “as soon as possible.”81
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Saudi Arabia is not the only Muslim state to be
pursuing a nuclear future. Turkey also announced an
ambitious “peaceful” atomic power program shortly
after Iran’s nuclear enrichment efforts were revealed
in 2002, and expressed an interest in 2008 in enriching
its own uranium.82 Given Turkish qualms about Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons, the possibility of Ankara
developing a nuclear weapons option (as it previously toyed with doing in the late 1970s)83 must be
taken seriously. In addition, Algeria and Egypt (political rivals) and Syria (a historical ally of Iran) all have
either attempted to develop nuclear weapons options
or refused to forswear making nuclear fuel, a process
that can bring them within weeks of acquiring a bomb.
Algeria now has enough plutonium and the skills to
separate it from spent fuel to make several bombs’
worth.84 Egypt, which has long complained about
Israeli nuclear weapons and previously attempted to
get nuclear weapons, has signed a deal with Russia to
construct its first large power reactor.85 Israel, meanwhile, continues to make nuclear weapons materials
at Dimona, and all of these states have nuclear-capable
missile systems (see figure 3-13).86

Note: States in beige already have established nuclear power programs.

Figure 3-13. States Planning to Have Their First
Nuclear Power Reactor by or before 2035
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Very little of this rhymes with the world a halfcentury ago. In the early 1960s, the only countries with
civilian nuclear power reactors were the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Russia. There are now 31
states. Most of these are in Eastern and Western Europe,
but as figure 3-13 shows, other states in far less stable
regions are hoping to bring their first nuclear power
plants online before 2035. This trend, particularly in
the Far and Middle East, has strategic implications.87
As already noted, each of these plants—even the
most proliferation-resistant light water reactor types—
can be regarded as a “nuclear bomb starter kit.”
Although the nuclear industry has consistently promoted the mistaken idea that the plutonium power
reactors produce is unsuitable to make bombs, these
reactors can be operated not only to produce large
amounts of reactor-grade plutonium that can be made
into bombs, but also large amounts of weapons-grade
and near-weapons-grade plutonium as well.88 In fact,
in their first 12-18 months of normal power production operation, these reactors can produce roughly 50
bombs’ worth of near-weapons-grade plutonium. If
refueled every 10 months, they can produce roughly
30 bombs’ worth of weapons-grade plutonium.89 The
plants can and have been used as covers to acquire
weapons related technology, hardware, and training.90
Finally, the massive amounts of low-enriched fresh fuel
stored at these reactors for safety reasons can afford
a source of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to jumpstart
a uranium enrichment weapons option.91 That is why
efforts are made to control the export of these plants
and why they are routinely inspected to guard against
military diversions.92
As for declared nuclear fuel making plants—uranium hexafluoride and enrichment facilities, plutonium separation and fuel fabrication plants, etc.—a
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deeper problem occurs that relates to the limits of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards themselves. Even under ideal circumstances,
the agency allows that, with commercial-sized plants,
it can lose track of special nuclear material. The margins of statistical error associated with the inspection of
these plants are egregiously large. Consider the reprocessing plant Japan wants to operate at Rokkasho. In
this case, the agency can be expected to lose track of
roughly 250 kilograms (i.e., roughly 50 first-generation bombs’ worth) a year. This means that nearly 50
bombs’ worth of weapons-usable plutonium could
possibly go missing from Rokkasho without setting off
any international inspection alarms at all.93
Will the world be able to cope with the further
spread of such “peaceful” nuclear facilities? Given the
additional noted missile, fissile, and weapons trends,
what, if anything, can be done to avoid their military
diversions or worse—more widespread nuclear weapons competitions and, far worse, a possible accidental
or intentional use of nuclear weapons?
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3
1. See Pew Research Center, “Public Uncertain, Divided Over
America’s Place in the World,” U.S. Politics and Policy, Princeton,
NJ: International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), May 5, 2016,
available from https://www.issuelab.org/resource/public-uncertaindivided-over-america-s-place-in-the-world-growing-support-forincreased-defense-spending.html; and Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike,
and Jacob Poushter, “Europeans wary of hard power,” Global
Attitudes and Trends, June 13, 2016, available from http://www.
pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-wary-of-hard-power/.
2. See Matthew Continetti, “A World in Crisis: What the
Thirties Tell Us about Today,” Weekly Standard, January 3, 2011,
available from https://www.weeklystandard.com/matthew-continetti/a-world-in-crisis; “Briefing—Lessons of the 1930s: There Could
Be Trouble Ahead,” The Economist, December 10, 2011, pp. 76-78;
80

Joe Weisenthal, “Tim Geithner Warns: The U.S. at Risk of a 1930s
Repeat,” Business Insider, September 12, 2010, available from
http://www.businessinsider.com/geithner-the-us-is-at-risk-of-a-repeatof-the-1930s-2010-9; Thomas Walkom, “Eurozone Crisis Signals a
Repeat of the 1930s,” Star (Toronto), May 15, 2012, available from
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/05/15/walkom_eurozone_
crisis_signals_a_repeat_of_the_1930s.html; and Roger Cohen, “Yes,
It Could Happen Again,” Atlantic, July 29, 2014, available from
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/08/yes-it-couldhappen-again/373465/. There are, of course, other views. See
Kishore Mahbubani and Lawrence H. Summers, “The Fusion
of Civilizations: The Case for Global Optimism,” Foreign Affairs,
June 12, 2016, available from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/2016-04-18/fusion-civilizations.
3. See Natural Resources Defense Council, “Table of Global
Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 1945-2002,” last updated November
25, 2002.
4. As of early 2018, the official number of deployed strategic warheads as counted under the New START Treaty (which
count heavy bombers as one warhead) places the number of U.S.
warheads at 1,350 and Russian warheads at 1,444. See “New
START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,”
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 2018, available from https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/278775.htm. Other
sources count more than one warhead per bomber. An average of
their estimates places the number of U.S. deployed strategic warheads at 1,740, plus 150 tactical warheads deployed in Europe,
for a total of 1,890 deployed warheads. The average estimate of
Russian deployed strategic warheads is 1,950. Russia is also estimated to have around 2,000 tactical warheads that the Russian
Government says are in central storage, which brings the total of
Russian warheads to 4,300. The figures for each country do not
include warheads considered to be non-deployed or awaiting
dismantlement. See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris,
“United States nuclear forces, 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 48-57, available
from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2016.1
264213; Hans M. Kristensen, “Tac Nuke Numbers Confirmed?”
Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 7, 2010, available from http://fas.org/

81

blogs/security/2010/12/tacnukes/; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S.
Norris, “Russian nuclear forces, 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 2017, pp. 125-134, available from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1290375;
Hans M. Kristensen, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, updated May 26, 2016,
available from https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-worldnuclear-forces/; and Shannon Kile and Hans Kristensen, “Trends
in World Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 2016, available from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/FS%201606%20
WNF_Embargo_Final%20A.pdf. U.S. President Trump has signaled
a willingness to continue reducing America’s nuclear weapons
stockpile, saying about nuclear weapons buildups: “If they stop,
we’ll stop, and frankly I’d like to get rid of a lot of them. And if
they want to do that, we’ll go along with them. We won’t lead the
way; we’ll go along with them.” See, David Martosko, “‘We’ll stop
in two minutes!’ Trump says America won’t build more nuclear
weapons – IF other nations make commitments first,” Daily Mail,
February 12, 2018, available from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-5382619/Trump-U-S-match-countries-nuke-reductions.html.
5. The United Kingdom has 120 deployed warheads and
France has 280 deployed warheads. India, Pakistan, Israel, and
China do not distinguish between deployed and stored warheads.
See “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, updated June 2018, available from https://www.
armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat; Kristensen,
“Status of World Nuclear Forces”; Robert S. Norris and Hans M.
Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2013,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5, September/October 2013, available from http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/5/75.full;
and Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, “Trends in World
Nuclear Forces, 2017,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm, Sweden:
SIPRI, July 2017, available from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/
files/2017-06/fs_1707_wnf.pdf. For the United Kingdom, also see
“Country Profile: United Kingdom,” Nuclear Threat Initiative,
updated October 2016, available from http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/united-kingdom/. For Pakistan, also see Hans M. Kristensen
and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 6, October 31, 2016, available
from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00963402.2016.12

82

41520. For Israel, also see Warner D. Farr, “The Third Temple’s
Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons,” Counterproliferation
Paper No. 2, Montgomery, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center,
Maxwell Air Force Base, September 1999, available from http://
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm. For China, also
see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese nuclear
forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 4, June
13, 2016, available from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108
0/00963402.2016.1194054.
6. The information used to generate this graph was drawn
from the sources in endnotes 3-5 in this chapter. In the case of
the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France, only
deployed warheads are shown. For all other countries, both
deployed and stored warheads are shown.
7. The number of kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium
required to make a first-generation Nakagaski, Japan, bomb is
set in this book conservatively at 4 kilograms—the number the
U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) has used. See “DPRK: Plutonium Program,” GlobalSecurity.org, available from http://
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-plutonium.htm; and
“Nuclear Weapon Design,” Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, October 21, 1998, available from http://fas.org/nuke/
intro/nuke/design.htm. The actual figure needed to fuel any given
bomb may be more or less, depending on how advanced the weapon’s design. The Soviet Union, for example, tested a device in 1953
that used only 2 kilograms of plutonium. That weapon produced a
yield of 5.8 kilotons. It also tested a weapon in 1953 that used only
0.8 kilograms of plutonium. It produced a yield of 1.6 kilotons.
See Pavel Podvig, “Amounts of Fissile Materials in Early Soviet
Nuclear Devices,” IPFM Blog, October 1, 2012, available from
http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2012/10/amounts_of_fissile_materi.
html; and Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The
Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed
for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons” working paper, Washington,
DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, April 13, 1998, available
from http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/fissionw/fissionweapons.pdf. The
amount of reactor-grade plutonium required to make a first-generation Nagasaki bomb is set in this book at 5.2 kilograms, or 30
percent more than the official DoE figure for weapons-grade plutonium. See Richard L. Garwin, “Reactor-Grade Plutonium Can

83

be Used to Make Powerful and Reliable Nuclear Weapons: Separated Plutonium in the Fuel Cycle Must Be Protected as If It Were
Nuclear Weapons,” August 26, 1998, available from http://fas.org/
rlg/980826-pu.htm.
8. See Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Nuclear Option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence: In Search of a New Framework
for Japan’s Nuclear Policy,” in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W.
Thompson, eds., Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and
Policy in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2003,
pp. 95-147, available from https://www.stimson.org/content/japansnuclear-option-security-politics-and-policy-21st-century; Frank von
Hippel, “Plutonium, Proliferation and Radioactive-Waste Politics in East Asia,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2012, pp. 111-140, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/
pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1113; Takuya Suzuki, “Nuclear Leverage:
Long an Advocate of Nuclear Energy, Nakasone Now Says Japan
Should Go Solar,” Asahi Shimbun, July 7, 2011; Douglas Birch, R.
Jeffrey Smith, and Jake Adelstein, “Plutonium Fever Blossoms in
Japan,” Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, May 19, 2014,
in which Japan’s former defense minister in 2012, Satoshi Morimoto, is quoted saying that the country’s nuclear power reactors
have “very great defensive deterrent functions,” available from
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/03/12/14394/plutonium-feverblossoms-Japan; and a radio interview of former Japanese Prime
Minister Naoto Kan noted that having plutonium on hand to have
an option to make bombs was one of the reasons why Japan under
Nakasone originally backed nuclear power. See “Ex-Japanese PM
on How Fukushima Meltdown was Worse Than Chernobyl and
Why He Now Opposes Nuclear Power,” Democracy Now, March
11, 2014, available from http://www.democracynow.org/2014/3/11/
ex_japanese_pm_on_how_fukushima.
9. See International Panel on Fissile Materials, Plutonium Separation in Nuclear Power Programs: Status, Problems, and Prospects of
Civilian Reprocessing Around the World, Princeton, NJ: IPFM, July
2015, p. 58, available from http://fissilematerials.org/library/2015/07/
plutonium_separation_in_nuclea.html; Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R.
Rajaraman, and M. V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia
and the Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” in Henry
D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War,

84

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008, pp. 192-195, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.
edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=832; Zahir Kazmi, “Normalizing
the Non-proliferation Regime,” Survival, Vol. 57, No. 1, February/March 2015; and Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski,
“Don’t Give Saudi Arabia an Easy Path to Nukes,” Foreign Policy,
March 1, 2018, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/01/
dont-give-saudi-arabia-an-easy-path-to-nukes/.
10. See “China’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” updated May 2018,
Philadelphia, PA: World New Association, available from
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/
countries-a-f/china-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx; and Global Fissile Material Report 2015, Princeton, NJ: IPFM, p. 31, available from http://
fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr15.pdf.
11. See Global Fissile Material Report 2015, IPFM, p. 25.
12. Ibid., p. 12.
13. A 10- to 20-kiloton yield nuclear weapon would roughly
require between 12-20 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium. If
the Chinese should choose to use the advanced nuclear weapons
designs that they clearly have on hand, the fissile requirements
could drop to between 4 to 5 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium per 10- to 20-kiloton yield device. It also should be noted that
plutonium could be used with HEU in a manner that would significantly reduce the amount of HEU required. Thus, the amount
of weapons-grade uranium required for a given critical mass can
be reduced by roughly 50 percent simply by using 2 kilograms
of plutonium in the core. On these points and China’s estimated
HEU holdings, see Cochran and Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium
and Highly-Enriched Uranium”; Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander
Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank N. von Hippel, Unmaking the Bomb:
A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014, pp. 38-39, 54-56; Gregory
S. Jones, “An Iran Nuclear Deal That Spreads Nuclear Weapons,”
August 10, 2015; and H. C. Paxton, “Los Alamos Critical-Mass
Data,” Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Report, LA-3067-MS, December 1975, p. 51, available from http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/
NCLCollectionStore/_Public/07/244/7244852.pdf.

85

14. See Arms Control Association, “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,” updated December 2017, available from https://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles; Nuclear Threat Initiative,
“Country Profiles,” available from http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/; and Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Missiles of the World,” Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project,
n.d., available from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/, accessed
August 13, 2014.
15. See Aaron Stein, “A Gordian Knot: Missiles in the Gulf,”
Arms Control Wonk (blog), April 30, 2014, available from https://
www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/604372/a-gordian-knot-missilesin-the-gulf/ .
16. See Matthew Harries, “Britain and France As Nuclear Partners,” Survival, February-March 2012, available from http://www.
iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2012-23ab/survival―globalpolitics-and-strategy-february-march-2012-7116/54-1-02-harries-9500.
17. See Winston Churchill, “Never Despair,” text of
speech before the House of Commons, London, UK, March
1, 1955, available from https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/
speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/never-despair/.
18. See John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from
Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010,
pp. 129-142; John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe
Them, New York: Free Press, 2006; and Steve Kidd, “Nuclear
Proliferation Risk―Is It Vastly Overrated?” Nuclear Engineering
International, July 23, 2010, available from http://www.neimagazine.
com/opinion/opinionnuclear-proliferation-risk-is-it-vastly-overrated/.
19. See endnotes 54-55 in chapter 2 of this volume; Anil A.
Athale, “Why Modi Wants to Change India’s Nuclear Policy,”
Rediff News, May 13, 2014, available from http://www.rediff.com/
news/column/ls-election-why-modi-wants-to-change-indias-nuclearpolicy/20140513.htm; P. R. Chari, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine:
Stirrings of Change,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, June 4, 2014, available from http://
carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/04/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-stirringsof-change/hcks; Liping Xia, “China’s Nuclear Doctrine: Debates and
Evolution,” Regional Voices on the Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence

86

Stability in Southern Asia, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, June 30, 2016; Fiona S. Cunningham and
M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear
Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security,
Fall 2015, pp. 7-50; and Hwang Sung-Hee, “N. Korea Leader
Orders Nuclear Arsenal on ‘Standby’,” Yahoo News, March 4,
2016, available from https://www.yahoo.com/news/n-korea-leaderorders-nuclear-arsenal-standby-kcna-223744330.html?ref=gs.
20. This debate, however, is ongoing. Compare to Graham
Allison, “Just How Likely Is Another World War?” The Atlantic, July 30, 2014, available from http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2014/07/just-how-likely-is-another-worldwar/375320/; Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare
Theory and Practice, Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2002; George
and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and
American World Dominance in the Twenty-first Century, New York:
Crown Publishers, 1996; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The
Obsolescence of Major War, New York: Basic Books, 1989, available
from http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//doom.pdf; Evan
Luard, War in International Society, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987; Yuval Noah Harari, “Why It’s No Longer Possible for Any Country to Win a War,” Time, June 23, 2017, available
from http://time.com/4826856/russia-trump-north-korea-china-war/;
and Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for
the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017.
21. See Sharon Weinberger, “How To: Visit A Secret Nuclear
Bunker,” Wired, June 11, 2008, available from http://www.wired.
com/dangerroom/2008/06/how-to-visit-a/; 20th Century Castles, LLC,
which sells decommissioned U.S. missile bases, including bases
for Atlas, Titan, and Nike missiles, available from http://www.
missilebases.com/properties; GCI Datacentres, which uses NATO
bunkers to secure and host computer servers, available from
http://gcichannelsolutions.com/products/data-centres/support-services.
html; and Siegfried Wittenburg, “A Warm Grave in a Cold War:
East German Nuclear Bunker Opens to Tourists,” Spiegel Online
International, August 26, 2011, available from http://www.spiegel.
de/international/germany/a-warm-grave-in-a-cold-war-east-germannuclear-bunker-opens-to-tourists-a-782755.html. Burlington Bunker
in Corsham, Wiltshire, UK, was formally a Cold War NATO

87

nuclear bunker and is now a tourist sight, available from http://
www.burlingtonbunker.co.uk/; and guided tours of a missile launch
facility and silo are offered by the National Park Service at the
Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in South Dakota, available from www.nps.gov/mimi/index.htm.
22. See “Yamantau,” GlobalSecurity.org, available from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/yamantau.htm; and
“What’s Going on in the Yamantau Mountain Complex?” Viewzone, available from http://www.viewzone.com/yamantau.html; Bill
Gertz, “Russia Building New Underground Nuclear Command
Posts,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 15, 2016, available
from
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-building-newunderground-nuclear-command-posts/; Bill Gertz, “Russia Sharply
Expanding Nuclear Arsenal, Upgrading Underground Facilities,” The Washington Free Beacon, available from http://freebeacon.
com/national-security/russia-sharply-expanding-nuclear-arsenalupgrading-underground-facilities/; and endnote 47 in chapter 2 of
this volume.
23. See “Yamantau”; “What’s Going on in the Yamantau
Mountain Complex?”; Gertz, “Russia Building New Underground Nuclear Command Posts”; Gertz, “Russia Sharply
Expanding Nuclear Arsenal”; and endnote 47 in chapter 2 of this
volume.
24. See James R. Holmes, “China’s Underground Great Wall,”
The Diplomat, August 20, 2011, available from http://www.thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/08/20/chinas-underground-greatwall/; Bret Stephens, “How Many Nukes Does China Have?”
The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2011, available from http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020434610457663950289
4496030.html; and William Wan, “Georgetown Students Shed
Light on China’s Tunnel System for Nuclear Weapons,” The
Washington Post, November 29, 2011, available from http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/georgetown-studentsshed-light-on-chinas-tunnel-system-for-nuclear-weapons/2011/11/16/
gIQA6AmKAO_story.html.
25. See Wan, “Georgetown Students Shed Light on China’s
Tunnel System for Nuclear Weapons.”
26. This definition of nuclear-capable missiles is drawn
directly from the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
See Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex Handbook,
88

2017, pp. 1-3, available from http://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/MTCR-Handbook-2017-INDEXED-FINAL-Digital.
pdf.
27. See Ian Easton and Mark Stokes, “China and the Emerging
Strategic Competition in Aerospace Power,” in Sokolski, ed., The
Next Arms Race, pp. 141-175.
28. See endnote 14 in this chapter.
29. On the vulnerability of U.S. strategic command and control systems and its land base ballistic missile force, see Bill Gertz,
“Stratcom: China Continuing to Weaponize Space with Latest
Anti-Satellite Missile Shot,” The Washington Free Beacon, August
13, 2014, available from http://freebeacon.com/national-security/
stratcom-china-continuing-to-weaponize-space-with-latest-antisatellite-missile-shot/; and Bruce Sugden, “China’s Conventional
Strikes against the U.S. Homeland,” Washington, DC: Center for
International Maritime Security, available from http://cimsec.org/
china-conventional-strike-us/11829, accessed August 18, 2014.
30. An example of the spread of increasingly accurate missiles
spreading to dangerous regions is the cooperation between North
Korea and Syria in the Syrian maneuverable re-entry vehicle Scud
D project in 2008. See United Nations Security Council, Final report
of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2345 (2017),
S/2018/171, March 5, 2018, para. 125, available from https://www.
un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports. There are,
of course, limits to how far one can substitute conventional for
nuclear munitions. See Steven Lukasik, “To What Extent Can Precision Conventional Technologies Substitute for Nuclear Weapons?” in Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race, pp. 387-412.
31. See Zachary Keck, “India, ‘Cold Start’ and Pakistani Tactical Nukes,” The Diplomat, May 8, 2013, available from http://
thediplomat.com/2013/05/india-cold-start-and-pakistani-tacticalnukes/; Ajai Shukla, “Army’s ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine Gets Teeth,”
Business Standard, July 22, 2011, updated January 20, 2013,
available from http://www.business-standard.com/article/economypolicy/army-s-cold-start-doctrine-gets-teeth-111072200071_1.
html; Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi, “India Toying with Dangerous Cold Start War Doctrine—Analysis,” Eurasia Review,
October 29, 2011, available from http://www.eurasiareview.

89

com/29102011-india-toying-with-dangerous-cold-start-war-doctrineanalysis/; Ali Ahmed, “India and Pakistan: Azm-e-Nau as a
Response to the Cold Start,” Hargeisa, Somaliland: Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Hargeisa, July 28, 2013,
available from http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4056;
Muhammad Azam Khan, “India’s Cold Start Is Too Hot”; Michael
Mazza, “Pakistan’s Strategic Myopia: Its Decision to Field Tactical
Nuclear Weapons Will Only Make the Subcontinent More Unstable,” The Wall Street Journal, April 2011, available from http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870409970457628876318
0683774.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; “Pakistan Army to Preempt
India’s ‘Cold Start Doctrine’,” The Express Tribune, June 16, 2013,
available from http://tribune.com.pk/story/564136/pakistan-armyto-preempt-indias-cold-start-doctrine/; Dinakar Peri, “Nirbhay Will
Be Backbone of ‘Cold Start,’ Say Experts,” The Hindu, October 24,
2014, updated May 23, 2016, available from http://www.thehindu.
com/news/national/nirbhay-will-be-backbone-of-coldstart-say-experts/
article6529087.ece; Zahid Gishkori, “LoC Skirmishes: Lawmaker
Raises the Spectre of Nuclear War,” The Express Tribune, October 23, 2014, available from http://tribune.com.pk/story/779830/locskirmishes-lawmaker-raises-the-spectre-of-nuclear-war/; and Henry
Sokolski, “Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan: Prospects
and Consequences,” testimony given December 8, 2015, before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, available from http://www.
npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1301&rtid=8.
32. See Jacob W. Kipp, “Asian Drivers of Russian Nuclear
Force Posture,” in Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race, pp. 45-82;
Mark B. Schneider, “Nuclear Weapons Modernization in Russia
and China: Understanding Impacts to the United States,” tes
timony given October 14, 2011, before the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, available from https://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71449/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71449.
pdf; Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike
‘de-escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014,
available
from
https://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limitednuclear-strike-de-escalation; Graham Ong-Webb, “Power Posturing:
China’s Tactical Nuclear Stance Comes of Age,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, September 2010, pp. 47-55, available from http://www.
academia.edu/412039/Power_Posturing_Chinas_Tactical_Nuclear_
Stance_Comes_of_Age_September_2010_;
Nicolas
Giacometti,

90

“Could China’s Nuclear Strategy Evolve?” The Diplomat, October 16, 2014, available from http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/couldchinas-nuclear-strategy-evolve/; and Jonathan Ray, “Red China’s
‘Capitalist Bomb’: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program,”
China Strategic Perspectives No. 8, Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 2015, available from http://inss.ndu.edu/
Media/News/Article/652871/red-chinas-capitalist-bomb-inside-thechinese-neutron-bomb-program/. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review,
the United States seems to be following the same theory about
the possible utility of low-yield nuclear weapons. See, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, February 2018, available from https://
media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEARPOSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
33. Brian Chow, “Avoiding Space War Needs a New
Approach,” Defense News, September 16, 2015, available from
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/09/16/
avoiding-space-war-needs-new-approach/32523905/; Ian Easton, China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities, Arlington, VA:
Project 2049, February 2014, available from http://www2.jiia.or.jp/
pdf/fellow_report/140219_JIIA-Project2049_Ian_Easton_report.pdf;
Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the
Asia-Pacific Region, Arlington, VA: Project 2049, May 27, 2010,
available from http://www.andrewerickson.com/2010/05/evolvingaerospace-trends-in-the-asia-pacific-region-implications-for-stabilityin-the-taiwan-strait-and-beyond/; and Elbridge Colby, “Welcome
to China and America’s Nuclear Nightmare,” The National Interest, December 19, 2014, available from http://nationalinterest.org/
feature/welcome-china-americas-nuclear-nightmare-11891.
34. Compare to Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris,
“Chinese nuclear forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Vol. 69, No. 6, 2013, available from https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1177/0096340213508632; and Bill Gertz, “The Warhead
Gap,” The Washington Free Beacon, November 9, 2012, available
from http://freebeacon.com/national-security/the-warhead-gap/.
35. See Mark Stokes, “Securing Nuclear Arsenals: A Chinese
Case Study,” in Henry Sokolski and Bruno Tertrais, eds., Nuclear
Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, pp.
65-85, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.
cfm?pubID=1156.
91

36. On China’s no first use policies, see China’s 2008 White
Paper, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” available from http://
www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.
pdf; also see analysis of this paper by Hans M. Kristensen, “China
Defense White Paper Describes Nuclear Escalation,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, January 23, 2009, available from http://fas.org/
blogs/security/2009/01/chinapaper/; and M. Taylor Ravel and Evan
S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 48-87, available from
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Search_for_Assured_
Retaliation.pdf.
37. See Danny Gittings, “General Zhu Goes Ballistic,” The
Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2005, available from https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB112165176626988025; and Mark Schneider, “The
Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China,”
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 3, Spring 2009, pp. 244-270. Also
see an earlier version, dated 2007, available from http://www.nipp.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/China-nuclear-final-pub.pdf.
38. See endnote 75 in this chapter; and Mark Stokes, “China’s
Future Nuclear Force Infrastructure: A Notional Breakout Scenario,” draft paper prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center East Asian Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures
Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 21, 2014, available
from
http://npolicy.org/article_file/Stokes_-_CHINA_NUCLEAR_
EXPANSION_SCENARIO.pdf.
39. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Defense, 2015, available from http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_
China_Military_Power_Report.pdf; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “China Making Some Missiles More Powerful,”
The New York Times, May 16, 2015, available from http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/05/17/world/asia/china-making-some-missilesmore-powerful.html?_r=0; Tong Zhao and David Cromer Logan,
“What if China Develops MIRVs?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 24, 2015, available from http://thebulletin.org/what-ifchina-develops-mirvs8133; and Bill Gertz, “China Adds Warheads
to Older DF-5s,” The Washington Times, February 10, 2016,

92

available from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/10/
inside-the-ring-china-adds-warhead-to-older-df-5s/.
40. See “China ‘Increasing Number of Missile Warheads,’” South China Morning Post, August 4, 2014,
available from http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1566294/
china-increasing-number-missile-warheads.
41. See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Report to Congress, Washington, DC: GPO, November 2012, pp. 170-214, available from https://www.uscc.gov/Press_
Releases/2012-report-congress-released; Gertz, “The Warhead Gap”;
and “Nuclear Weapons: China’s Nuclear Forces,” GlobalSecurity.
org, July 7, 2014, available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
world/china/nuke.htm.
42. A sharp critique of recent estimates that China might have
as many as 3,000 nuclear weapons, though, was hardly reassuring in emphasizing that China could only “theoretically” have as
many as 1,660 nuclear weapons. For more on this controversy,
see Hans Kristensen, “No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear
Weapons,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 3, 2011, available from http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/12/chinanukes/.
43. The numbers used to generate this chart came from the
sources listed in endnotes 3-5 in this chapter, plus Robert Burns,
“US weighing steep nuclear arms cuts,” Associated Press, February 14, 2012, available from http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2012/02/14/ap_newsbreak_us_weighing_steep_
nuclear_arms_cuts/; and Kristensen, “No, China Does Not Have
3,000 Nuclear Weapons.”
44. See Bill Gertz, “McKeon: State Department Ignores Major
Russian Treaty Violation: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
Treaty Breached,” The Washington Free Beacon, July 15, 2013,
available from http://freebeacon.com/national-security/mckeon-statedepartment-ignores-major-russian-treaty-violation/; and Jim Thomas,
“Statement before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces on the Future of the INF Treaty,” July 17, 2014,
available from https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Thomas-INF-testimony1.pdf.

93

45. See Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise
Missile, Violating Treaty,” The New York Times, July 28, 2014,
available from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/
us-says-russia-tested-cruise-missile-in-violation-of-treaty.html.
46. See William James, “Trump says wants nuclear arsenals cut ‘very substantially’,” Reuters, January 15, 2017,
available
from
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumprussia-arms-idUSKBN14Z0XS; and Guy Faulconbridge and
William James, “Trump’s offer to Russia: an end to sanctions for nuclear arms cut―London Times,” Reuters, January 16, 2017, available from http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-trump-russia-arms-deal-idUSKBN14Z0YE.
47. See Mari Saito, Aaron Sheldrick, and Kentaro Hamada,
“Japan may only be able to restart one-third of its nuclear
reactors,” Reuters, April 2, 2014, available from http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/04/02/us-japan-nuclear-restarts-insightidUSBREA3020020140402. In private interviews with several
leading Japanese nuclear experts, the range of restarts given is
somewhat higher—between 15-25 light water reactors. As of the
time of this writing, only eight reactors were operating in Japan.
48.
See “France and Japan Announce Cooperation on Generation IV Astrid FBR,” NucNet, May 6, 2014,
available from http://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/05/06/
france-and-japan-announce-cooperation-on-generation-iv-astrid-fbr.
49. On these points, see von Hippel, “Plutonium, Proliferation and Radioactive-Waste Politics”; Henry Sokolski, “The
Post-Fukushima Arms Race?” Foreign Policy Online, July 29, 2011,
available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/29/the_
post_fukushima_arms_race; and Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan delays
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant,” Associated Press, November
16, 2015, available from http://www.canadianmanufacturing.com/
technology/japan-delays-nuclear-fuel-reprocessing-plant-157735/.
50. Frank von Hippel, “Options for Disposal of Separated
Plutonium,” presentation at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club
of Japan, April 19, 2018, available from http://npolicy.org/Articles/
FvH%2C%20FCCJ%2019April2018rev11.pdf.

94

51. By the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission’s own calculations made after the Fukushima accident, starting Rokkasho
would only make sense over the next 20 to 30 years if more than
15 percent of Japan’s electricity was produced by nuclear power
reactors—i.e., 20 or more power reactors would have to be operating. As of the writing of this volume, Japan had only eight reactors
online, and it is unclear if the 15 percent criteria will ever be met.
On this point, see endnote 41 in this chapter and slides 24-30 from
the presentation of former Japanese Atomic Energy Commission
Vice Chairman, Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Nuclear Energy and Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Policy Options after the Fukushima Accident,” presentation at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center East Asian
Alternative Energy Futures Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 26, 2014, available from http://npolicy.org/article_file/SuzukiJapan-energy-nuclear-policy.pdf.
52. See “Civilian HEU: Japan,” Nuclear Threat Initiative,
April 23, 2014, available from http://www.nti.org/analysis/
articles/civilian-heu-japan/; and Aaron Sheldrikc and Yuka
Obayashi, “Japan to Send Weapons Grade Plutonium Back
to U.S. this Weekend, Greenpeace Says,” Reuters, March
18,
2016,
available
from
http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-japan-nuclear-plutonium-idUSKCN0WK0VI.
53. See endnote 8 in this chapter; Peter Symonds, “Is Japan
Developing a Nuclear Weapons Program?” Global Research,
May 7, 2013, available from http://www.globalresearch.ca/is-japandeveloping-a-nuclear-weapons-program/5334227; Robert Windrem,
“Japan Has Nuclear ‘Bomb in the Basement,’ and China Isn’t
Happy,” NBC News, March 11, 2014, available from https://www.
nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclearbomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976; and Hiroko Tabuchi,
“Japan Pushes Plan to Stockpile Plutonium, Despite Proliferation
Risks,” The New York Times, April 9, 2014, available from http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/04/10/world/asia/japan-pushes-plan-to-stockpileplutonium-despite-proliferation-risks.html, where a former senior
Japanese Trade Ministry official touts the deterrent value of having
Rokkasho and separated plutonium on the ready. Also see, Elizabeth Shim, “Japan’s Defense Chief Stands by Past Statement on
Nuclear Armament,” UPI, October 12, 2016, available from http://
www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/10/12/Japans-defensechief-stands-by-past-statement-on-nuclear-armament/9541476297288/.

95

54. Reactor-grade plutonium’s tendency to fission spontaneously and to produce more heat than weapons-grade plutonium that has higher plutonium 239 and plutonium 241 isotopic
content makes reactor-grade plutonium less than optimal for use
in first-generation weapons designs of 1945. However, as the U.S.
Department of Energy noted in 1997, even assuming one used the
crudest weapons design and fueled it with reactor-grade plutonium, yields “of the order of one or a few kilotons” could be expected.
See endnote 5 in this chapter; and Robert Selden, “Reactor Plutonium and Nuclear Explosives,” a slide presentation made before
the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
in Vienna and before the Atomic Industrial Forum in Washington,
DC, 1976, available from http://nuclearpolicy101.org/wp-content/
uploads/PDF/Selden_Reactor-Plutonium_slides.pdf; Bruce Goodwin,
“Reactor Plutonium Utility in Nuclear Explosives,” brief given
before a meeting at the New Diplomacy Initiative, Tokyo, Japan,
November 6, 2015, available from http://docplayer.net/37211297Reactor-plutonium-utility-in-nuclear-explosives-bruce-t-goodwin-phd-associate-director-at-large-for-national-security-policyresearch.html; U.S. Department of Energy, “Nonproliferation and
Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material
Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives,” DOE/
NN-0007, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, January
1997, pp. 37-39, available from http://fissilematerials.org/library/
doe97.pdf; and J. Carson Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 4, No. 1,
1993, pp. 111-128, available from http://scienceandglobalsecurity.
org/archive/sgs04mark.pdf. More importantly, weapons engineers
today can readily compensate for these deficiencies. First, with
highly precise missile delivery systems, the need for high-yield
warheads to destroy point targets is dramatically reduced. As for
destroying city centers, the difference between a 5 to 10 kiloton
weapon and a 20 kiloton Nagasaki weapon is relatively small
(this is because only a portion of the explosive power of any
nuclear weapon exploded above a target impacts that target’s surface plane) and even much smaller yield weapons would be quite
destructive. Even at the very lowest range—at 1 kiloton—the
radius of destruction would still be roughly one-third that of the
Hiroshima bomb. For a more detailed explanation of how increases
in yield and aiming accuracies translate into increases in lethality,
see Henry Sokolski and Kate Harrison, “Two Modern Military
Revolutions: Dramatic Increases in Explosive Yields and Aiming

96

Accuracies,” Arlington, VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center, October 24, 2013, available from http://nuclearpolicy101.
org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/Two-Modern-Military-Revolutions.pdf.
Second, weapons designers can significantly mitigate most, if
not all, of the heat and high-neutron emission downsides of reactor-grade plutonium by utilizing warhead designs that the United
States and Russia perfected and deployed over a half-century
ago—e.g., hollow cores, levitated pits, two-point ellipsoid designs,
composite highly-enriched uranium-plutonium cores, etc.—and
using the latest high-explosive, heat management, and triggering
technologies. These techniques would allow Japan to acquire relatively efficient, reliable yields using reactor-grade plutonium. See
Gregory S. Jones, Reactor Grade Plutonium and Nuclear Weapons:
Exploding the Myths, Arlington, VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, April 2018, available from http://www.npolicy.org/
thebook.php?bid=37. Finally, more advanced designs that employ
boosting with thermonuclear fuels, such as tritium, would eliminate the neutron emission weapons design problems posed by
reactor-grade plutonium. See Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski, “The Other Dangers from That North Korean Nuke Test,” The
Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2016, available from http://npolicy.
org/article.php?aid=1304&rid=2; David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Update on North Korea’s reactors, Enrichment
Plant, and Possible Isotope Separation Facility,” Washington, DC:
Institute for Science and International Security, February 1, 2016,
available from http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/update-onnorth-koreans-reactors-enrichment-plant-and-possible-isotope-sepa/;
Thomas B. Cochran, “Technological Issues Related to the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” presentation to Strategic Weapons
Proliferation Teaching Seminar, San Diego, CA, August 23, 1998,
available from http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1310&tid=4; and
Gregory Jones, “Heavy Water Nuclear Power Reactors: A Source
of Tritium for Potential South Korean Boosted Fission Weapons,” Proliferation Matters, February 29, 2016, available from http://
nebula.wsimg.com/344f048726407b8951892db91c98a0b1?AccessKeyI
d=40C80D0B51471CD86975&disposition=0&alloworigin=1.
55. See “Revisions to Japanese Atomic Law Cause Worry over
Possible Weapons Aim,” Global Security Newswire, June 22, 2012,
available from http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/revisions-japaneseatomic-law-spark-concern-about-possible-weapon-development/.

97

56. See “Alarm Over Nuke Stockpiles,” The Star Online,
October 25, 2015, available from http://www.thestar.com.my/
News/Regional/2015/10/25/Alarm-over-nuke-stockpiles-Japanshould-respond-to-concerns-of-the-international-community/;
and
the “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Materials,” Beijing, China: China
Arms Control and Disarmament Association, China Institute of
Nuclear Information and Economics, September 2015, available
from http://fissilematerials.org/library/cacda15.pdf; “S. Korea Could
End Up Sandwiched Among Nuclear Powers,” The Chosunilb,
June 29, 2012, available from http://english.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2012/06/29/2012062901173.html; Austin Ramzy, “China
Complains about Plutonium in Japan,” Sinosphere (blog), The
New York Times, June 10, 2014, available from http://sinosphere.
blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/china-complains-about-plutonium-injapan/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Liu Chong, “Japan’s Plutonium Problem,” Beijing Review, March 17, 2014, available from
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2014-03/17/content_607155.
htm; and Fredrik Dahl, “U.S. defends Japan against China’s plutonium criticism,” Reuters, March 5, 2014, available from http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/05/us-japan-plutonium-usa-idUSBR
EA2421A20140305?irpc=932&irpc=932.
57. See Anna Fifield, “As North Korea Flexes its Muscles,
Some in South Want Nukes, too,” The Washington Post, March
20, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/as-north-korea-flexes-its-muscles-the-other-korea-looks-atnukes-too/2016/03/20/e2b1bb22-eb88-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.
html; “S.Koreans Must Discuss Acquiring Nuclear Arms,” The
Chosunilb, January 28, 2016, available from http://english.chosun.
com/site/data/html_dir/2016/01/28/2016012801950.html;
“‘Seoul
Temporarily Drop Out NPT,’ says Chung Mong-joon,” The
Dong-A Ilbo, February 15, 2016, available from http://english.donga.
com/Home/3/all/26/525363/1; and “U.S. would Back a Rethink of
Japan’s Plutonium Recycling Program: White House,” The Japan
Times, May 21, 2016, available from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2016/05/21/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-back-rethink-japansplutonium-recycling-program-white-house/#.V17f94SDGkr.
58. On these points, see Thomas Meade and Eileen Supko,
“Enrichment excess is here to stay,” Nuclear Engineering International, October 13, 2015, available from http://www.neimagazine.
com/features/featureenrichment-excess-is-here-to-stay-4691321/.

98

59. It should be noted that China might encounter difficulties in achieving its 2020 reactor capacity goal. See Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, The World Nuclear Industry Status
Report 2014, Paris, France: Mycle Schneider Consulting, July
2014, pp. 105-110, available from http://www.worldnuclearreport.
org/IMG/pdf/201408msc-worldnuclearreport2014-lr-v3.pdf;
David
Stanway, “China Says First Westinghouse Reactor Delayed
until At Least End-2015,” Reuters, July 18, 2014, available
from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/china-nuclear-apidUKL4N0PT0T820140718?irpc=932; and Stephen Chen, “As
China’s Economy Matures, It Trades Speed for Build Quality
on Big Projects,” South China Morning Post, September 21, 2014,
available from http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1596995/
chinas-economy-matures-it-trades-speed-build-quality-big-projects.
60. These estimates assume China would employ the
advanced nuclear weapons designs it has clearly mastered and
that, as such, only 12 kilograms of HEU would be needed per Chinese weapon. See endnote 13 in this chapter. On China’s projected
enrichment capability and plans, see Hui Zhang, Assessing China’s
Uranium Enrichment Capacity, Paper, Institute for Nuclear Materials
Management 57th Annual Meeting, July 24-28, 2016, Atlanta, GA,
available from https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessingchinas-uranium-enrichment-capacity; and World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Enrichment,” updated May 2017, available from
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/
conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.aspx. For
2020, Zhang forecasts 13.5 million Separative Work Unit (SWU)
per year.
61. This set of uranium weapons estimates conservatively
assumes Japan would need 20 kilograms of HEU per weapon.
It is possible, however, that Japan might need as little as 12 or
13 kilograms per weapon. See endnote 13 in this chapter. On
Japan’s enrichment capability, see WISE Uranium Project,
“World Nuclear Fuel Facilities”; and Frank von Hippel, Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycles in Northeast Asia, paper presented to the
Panel on Peace and Security of North East Asia, Nagasaki, Japan,
November 20, 2016, available from http://npolicy.org/article_file/
Civilian%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20Cycles%20in%20NE%20Asia%20
28Oct2016%20%28rev.%202%29.pdf.

99

62. For the number of SWU to make 1 kilogram of HEU
or refuel one GWe reactor, see Richard L. Garwin, “HEU Done
It,” Letter to the Editor of Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005, in
response to an article by Selig S. Harrison, “‘Did North Korea
Cheat?” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005, available from
http://www.fas.org/rlg/030005HDI.pdf; and “Separative Work
Unit (SWU),” World Nuclear Association Glossary, updated March
2014, available from http://www.world-nuclear.org/Nuclear-Basics/
Glossary/. For China and Japan figures, see endnotes 59-60 in this
chapter. Reports from November 2014 indicate that North Korea
began operating a new enrichment facility capable of doubling
its existing 8,000 SWU per year enrichment capacity, but production of weapons-grade material at the new facility has not been
confirmed. See David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Recent
Doubling of Floor Space at North Korean Gas Centrifuge Plant:
Is North Korea doubling its enrichment capacity at Yongbyon?”
Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security,
August 8, 2013, available from http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/
detail/recent-doubling-of-floor-space-at-north-korean-gas-centrifugeplant/10; and “North Korea puts new uranium enrichment facility
into operation―media,” Tass, November 5, 2014, available from
http://itar-tass.com/en/world/758055.
63. See Julian Borger, “South Korea Considers Return of
U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Guardian (Manchester), November 22, 2010, available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
nov/22/south-korea-us-tactical-weapons-nuclear; David Dombey
and Christian Oliver, “US Rules Out Nuclear Redeployment in
South Korea,” Financial Times, March 1, 2011, available from http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e8a2d456-43b0-11e0-b117-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz4BZxYOR00; and Ser Myo-ja, “Bring Back U.S. Nukes,
Says Blue House Report,” Korea Joongang Daily, October 14, 2016,
available from http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/
Article.aspx?aid=3024895.
64. See Daniel Pinkston, “The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional Stability,” In
Pursuit of Peace (blog), Washington, DC: International Crisis
Group, October 25, 2012, available from http://blog.crisisgroup.org/
asia/2012/10/25/the-new-south-korean-missile-guidelines-and-futureprospects-for-regional-stability/; and Jeffrey Lewis, “RoK Missile
Rationale Roulette,” Arms Control Wonk (blog), October 9, 2012,

100

available from https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205771/
rok-missile-rationale-roulette/.
65. After more than 5 years of negotiations, the United States
and South Korea finally agreed to a nuclear cooperative agreement in June 2015. This agreement initially prevents South Korea
from reprocessing or enriching U.S.-origin nuclear materials.
The agreement, however, also creates a consultative process that
would allow South Korea to change this. There is good reason to
believe that South Korea will continue to press its case for such
a change. See James E. Platte, “Next Steps for U.S.-South Korea
Civil Nuclear Cooperation,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, July 1, 2015,
available from http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/
apb316_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35218; and Soo Kim, Proliferation Fallout from the Iran Deal: The South Korean Case Study,
Washington, DC: FDD Press, October 2015, available from http://
www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/Proliferation_
Fallout_South_Korea.pdf.
66. See Frank von Hippel and Fumihiko Yoshida, “A Little-Known Nuclear Race Taking Place in East Asia Is Dangerous and Pointless,” Huffington Post, April 5, 2016, available
from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-von-hippel/nuclear-raceasia_b_9609116.html; Henry Sokolski, “Can East Asia Avoid a
Nuclear Explosive Materials Arms Race?” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March 28, 2016, available from http://thebulletin.org/
can-east-asia-avoid-nuclear-explosive-materials-arms-race9295; and
Brad Sherman, Jeff Fortenberry, and Adam Schiff, “Letter to President [Obama] Regarding the Production of Fissile Material in
East Asia,” June 10, 2016, available from http://npolicy.org/article.
php?aid=1317&rtid=4.
67. For a complete historiography of South Korea’s nuclear
weapons program, see Alexander Lanoszka, “Seoul in Isolation: Explaining South Korean Nuclear Behavior, 1968-1980,”
Protection States Trust?: Major Power Patronage, Nuclear Behavior,
and Alliance Dynamics, PhD. Dissertation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2010, available from http://www.alexlanoszka.com/
AlexanderLanoszkaROK.pdf.
68. See Ted Galen Carpenter, “South Korea’s Growing Nuclear Flirtation,” China-US Focus, April 24, 2013,

101

available
from
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/
south-koreas-growing-nuclear-flirtation/.
69. See Gerard Baker and Alastair Gale, “South Korea President Warns on Nuclear Domino Effect,” The Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2014, available from http://online.wsj.com/articles/
south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-warns-on-nuclear-dominoeffect-1401377403.
70. See Anna Fifield, “As North Korea Flexes its Muscles,
Some in South Want Nukes, Too,” The Washington Post, March
20, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
asia_pacific/as-north-korea-flexes-its-muscles-the-other-korea-looks-atnukes-too/2016/03/20/e2b1bb22-eb88-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.
html.
71. For example, after the fifth nuclear test, Representative
Won Yoo-chul from the ruling Saenuri Party said, “We need to
take steps to be armed with our own nuke not only to protect
ourselves, but to preserve peace.” See “Lawmakers call for nukes
following N. Korea’s 5th nuclear test,” Yonhap News, September 9,
2016, available from http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016
/09/09/0401000000AEN20160909008151315.html.
72. See endnote 16 in chapter 2 of this volume, and Ian
Easton, “Japanese Strategic Weapons Programs and Strategies:
Future Scenarios and Alternative Approaches,” Arlington, VA:
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2015, available
from http://npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch7_Easton.pdf; and Charles
D. Ferguson, “How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy
Nuclear Weapons,” Arlington, VA: The Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, 2015, available from http://npolicy.org/books/
East_Asia/Ch4_Ferguson.pdf.
73. When polled, roughly 10 percent of the Japanese electorate now identify themselves as New Rightists. Yet an additional
percentage of Japanese may be sympathetic to the New Right.
Japanese New Rightists now have their own organized political
parties; the age of those who identify with these organizations is
dropping and is now much lower than it was a generation ago.
More importantly, as Japan reforms its foreign and military policies, the political parties with the clearest views on these topics
are the New Right. See Yuka Hayashi, “Tensions in Asia Stoke

102

Rising Nationalism in Japan: Young Conservatives, Japan’s Version of U.S. Tea Party, Are Fast Gaining Clout,” The Wall Street
Journal, February 26, 2014, available from http://online.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702304610404579403492918900378; Kathryn Ibata-Arens, “Why Japan’s Right Turn Could Be Trouble for
the US,” Daily Beast, December 16, 2012, available from http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/16/why-japan-s-right-turncould-be-trouble-for-the-u-s.html; Roland Kelts, “The Identity Crisis
that Lurks Behind Japan’s Right-Wing Rhetoric,” Time, May 31,
2013, available from http://world.time.com/2013/05/31/the-identitycrisis-that-lurks-behind-japans-right-wing-rhetoric/; and Jake Adelstein and Mari Yamamoto, “Japan: Shinzo Abe’s Government Has
a Thing About Hitler. It Likes Him,” Daily Beast, May 23, 2017,
available from http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2017/05/23/
japan-shinzo-abes-government-has-a-thing-about-hitler-it-likes-him?.
74. See endnote 66 in this chapter.
75. At the height of the Cold War, the United States had over
31,000 nuclear weapons; the Soviets had 40,000 (see endnote 18 in
chapter 2 of this volume). Some senior military planners, however,
considered even these high numbers to be insufficient. For example, in a recently declassified official DoD history, it was revealed
that the U.S. Army alone in 1956 had a requirement for 151,000
nuclear weapons. This suggests how nuclear warhead requirements might trend upward in an unconstrained East Asian nuclear
weapons competition. See Office of the Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Atomic Energy), History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945 through September 1977, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1978, p. 50,
available from http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/306.
pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the demanding requirements for any state contemplating tactical weapons deployments
today of the sort South Korea or China might choose to pursue,
see Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities,” Stimson Center Analysis,
March 10, 2015, available from https://www.stimson.org/content/
pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-operational-myths-and-realities.
76. See Adrian Levy, “India is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear
City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Experts Say,” Foreign Policy, December 16, 2015, available from http://foreignpolicy.

103

com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/;
and International Panel on Fissile Materials, Plutonium Separation in Nuclear Power Programs, 2015. Also see “India to Commission Breeder Reactor in 2013,” New Indian Express, February
20, 2012, available from http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/
article322002.ece; Paul Brannan, “Further Construction Progress of Possible New Military Uranium Enrichment Facility in
India,” Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International
Security, October 5, 2011, available from http://www.isis-online.
org/isis-reports/detail/further-construction-progress-of-possible-newmilitary-uranium-enrichment-f/7; Douglas Busvine, “India nuke
enrichment plant expansion operational in 2015 – IHS,” Reuters,
June 20, 2014, available from https://www.reuters.com/article/indianuclear/india-nuke-enrichment-plant-expansion-operational-in-2015ihs-idINKBN0EV0JR20140620; and “India Plans to Construct Six
More Fast Breeder Reactors,” The Economic Times, December 1,
2015, available from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/
energy/power/india-plans-to-construct-six-more-fast-breeder-reactors/
articleshow/49999373.cms.
77. “Russia to Provide ‘Seeker’ Tech for Agni-V ICBM,”
Asian Defence News, October 26, 2011, available from http://www.
asian-defence.net/2011/10/russia-to-provide-seeker-tech-for.html/; B.
K. Pandey, “Agni-V to Be Launched By March End,” SP’s Aviation.net, available from http://www.sps-aviation.com/story_issue.
asp?Article=900; and “Why Is This DRDO Official in Moscow?”
Trishul (blog), October 5, 2011, available from http://trishul-trident.
blogspot.com/2011/10/why-is-this-drdo-official-in-moscow.html.
78. See Jeff Stein, “Exclusive: CIA Helped Saudis in Secret
Chinese Missile Deal,” Newsweek, January 29, 2014, available from
http://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-cia-helped-saudis-secret-chinesemissile-deal-227283; Bill Gertz, “Saudi Arabia Shows Off Chinese
Missiles,” The Washington Free Beacon, May 2, 2014, available from
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/saudi-arabia-shows-off-chinesemissiles/; Mark Urban, “Saudi nuclear weapons ‘on order’ from
Pakistan,” BBC News, November 6, 2013, available from http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24823846; “Report: Saudi
Arabia to Buy Nukes if Iran Tests A-bomb,” MSNBC, February
10, 2012, available from https://warsclerotic.com/2012/02/10/reportsaudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb/; Andrew Dean and
Nicholas A. Heras, “Iranian Crisis Spurs Saudi Reconsideration of

104

Nuclear Weapons,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 10, No. 4, February 23,
2012, pp. 4-6, available from http://www.jamestown.org/programs/
gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39048&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=26&cHash=9aecde0ac8f6849d8877289c07a49ad7; Mustafa
Alani, “How Iran Nuclear Standoff Looks to Saudis,” Bloomberg
View, February 15, 2012, available from http://www.bloombergview.
com/articles/2012-02-16/how-iran-nuclear-standoff-looks-from-saudiarabia-mustafa-alani; and Ali Ahmad, “The Saudi Proliferation
Question,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 17, 2013,
available from http://thebulletin.org/saudi-proliferation-question.
79. On why the United States should not sign any civilian
nuclear cooperative agreement with Saudi Arabia that would
allow uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, see Gilinsky and Sokolski, “Don’t Give Saudi Arabia an Easy Path to
Nukes.”
80. See Jason Burke, “Riyadh Will Build Nuclear Weapons
if Iran Gets Them, Saudi Prince Warns,” The Guardian (Manchester), June 29, 2011, available from http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/jun/29/saudi-build-nuclear-weapons-iran; and Angelina Rascouet and Wael Mahdi, “Saudi Arabia to Select Nuclear
Power-Plant Site ‘Very Soon’,” Bloomberg, October 20, 2016,
available from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/
saudi-arabia-to-select-nuclear-power-plant-site-very-soon.
81. See Vivian Salama, “Saudi crown prince: If Iran makes
a nuclear bomb, so will we,” NBC News, March 19, 2018,
available
from
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/
saudi-crown-prince-if-iran-makes-nuclear-bomb-so-will-n857921.
82. See “Turkey Considers Uranium Enrichment for
Own Nuclear Power Plants,” RIA Novosti, January 15,
2008,
available
from
http://cc.bingj.com/cache.aspx?q=Turkey+Considers+Uranium+Enrichment+forOwn+Nuclear+Power+Plants&d=4658495116418449&mkt=en-US&setlang=en-US&w=FZ-pSDHFA-NGcFLwFaa7lYSnQkuoc5hZ;
“Japan’s Energy Pact with Turkey Raises Nuclear Weapons
Concerns,” Asahi Shimbun, January 7, 2014; and Rebecca Flood,
“Turkey is trying to get an ATOMIC BOMB in secret weapons plan, warns expert,” Express, August 8, 2017, available
from
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/838694/

105

Turkey-atomic-bomb-Recep-Tayyip-Erdo-an-nuclear-weapon-fears/
amp.
83. Turkish nuclear engineers in the late 1970s were asked by
their government to investigate how plutonium from spent light
water reactor fuel might be used to make nuclear explosives. They
determined that it was quite feasible. Compare to Hans Rühle,
“Is Turkey Secretly Working on Nuclear Weapons?” The National
Interest, September 22, 2015, available from http://nationalinterest.
org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898; and U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, “International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century,” NNSA Report NA-24, Washington,
DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, October 2007, pp.
93-94.
84. See Bruno Tertrais, “Alternative Proliferation Futures for
North Africa,” in Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race, pp. 205-238.
85. See “Egypt to Launch Global Tender for Nuclear Power
Plant by End of 2014,” Ahram Online, July 19, 2014, available
from http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/106618/Business/
Economy/Egypt-to-launch-global-tender-for-nuclear-power-pl.aspx;
Rafael Ofek, “Egypt’s Nuclear Dreams,” Israel Defense, February
11, 2013, available from http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/
egypts-nuclear-dreams; and Shaul Shay, “Will Egypt Go Nuclear?”
Arutz Sheva, September 13, 2012, available from http://www.
israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/12181.
86. See Avner Cohen, “Paying Too Much for Insurance,”
Haaretz, June 6, 2014, available from http://www.haaretz.com/
opinion/1.597240.
87. On potential Middle Eastern nuclear arms races,
see Henry Sokolski, “In the Middle East, Soon Everyone Will Want the Bomb,” Foreign Policy, May 21,
2018,
available
from
http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/21/
in-the-middle-east-soon-everyone-will-want-the-bomb/.
88. This point has long been understood in the nuclear weapons engineering community. See endnote 52 in this chapter. Thus,
the Ronald Reagan administration formally proposed acquiring
an unfinished Washington Power Supply System light water

106

reactor in Washington State in 1987 to increase U.S. production
of weapons plutonium and tritium. See Milton Hoenig, “Energy
Department Blurs the Line Between Civilian, Military Reactors,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 43, No. 5, June 1987, pp. 25-27,
available from http://books.google.com/books?id=pQYAAAAAMBAJ
&pg=PA25&dq=wppss+weapons+plutonium+production+doe&hl=e
n&sa=X&ei=yISkU7mvB9froAS5_YKoCQ&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#
v=onepage&q=wppss%20weapons%20plutonium%20production%20
doe&f=false; and Oversight Hearing on Potential Conversion of
WPPSS 1 Commercial Nuclear Power plant to a Production Reactor, Before the House Subcommittee on General Oversight and
Investigations of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Hearing held in Portland, OR, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1988,
Ser. No. 100-42, Washington, DC: GPO, 1988, available from http://
babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000014315848;view=1up;seq=1.
89. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Stanford
University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation
determined that a standard 1-gigawatt electrical light water reactor of the sort the United States pledged to North Korea as part of
the 1994 Agreed Framework (which is similar to the light water
reactor at Bushehr, Iran) would produce 300 kilograms of “fuelgrade” plutonium, which is nearly weapons-grade in the first 12
to 18 months of operation, and the rector could be operated to continue to produce 150 kilograms of “essentially” weapons-grade
plutonium every 9 to 10 months. See Michael May, ed., Verifying the Agreed Framework, Report CGSR-2001-001, Livermore,
CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Center for Global
Security Research, April 2001, p. 65, available from https://cgsr.llnl.
gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR-2001-001.pdf. On the weapons utility
of this “beginning of life” fuel-grade plutonium as compared to
weapons and super weapons-grade plutonium, see the analysis
of former weapons designer Harmon Hubbard in Victor Gilinsky,
Marvin Miller, and Harmon Hubbard, A Fresh Examination of the
Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, Working Paper 1701,
Arlington, VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, October 22, 2004, updated March 2017, available from http://npolicy.org/
article_file/1701_Fresh_Examination_of_LWR_Proliferation_Dangers.
pdf.
90. See Susan Voss, “Scoping Intangible Proliferation Related
to Peaceful Nuclear Programs: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation

107

within a Commercial Nuclear Power Program,” in Henry D.
Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 2014, pp. 149-183, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.
edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1204.
91. See Gilinsky, Miller, and Hubbard.
92. On the less than comprehensive character of these
inspections and diversion worries this raises, see “In Pursuit
of the Undoable: Troubling Flaws in the World’s Nuclear Safeguards,” The Economist, August 23, 2007, available from http://
www.economist.com/node/9687869; and Henry D. Sokolski, “Assessing the IAEA’s Ability to Verify the NPT,” in Henry D. Sokolski,
ed., Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008,
pp. 3-61, available from http://npolicy.org/thebook.php?bid=5#intro.
93. See Marvin M. Miller, “Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?” reprinted in Paul Leventhal, Sharon Tanzer, and Steven Dolley, eds., Nuclear Power and
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002,
p. 273.

108

CHAPTER 4. WHAT MIGHT HELP
These trends invite disorder. How much depends
on how well the United States, Russia, China, and
other key states deal with them.
Despite Washington’s strained relations with
Moscow, U.S. President Donald Trump is still interested in negotiating more nuclear constraints with
Russia.1 The United States has encouraged all countries to protect civilian and military nuclear facilities
and stores of weapons-usable nuclear materials against
theft or sabotage. The United States has tried to persuade non-weapons states to forgo civilian reprocessing or enrichment.
These U.S. nuclear control initiatives, even if successful, still leave much to be done. Several related
areas cry out for greater attention: nuclear and missile developments in China and East Asia, the global
spread of “peaceful” nuclear technology, and the continued failure to develop a consistent, broad approach
to preventing nuclear proliferation. This suggests three
recommendations.
RECOMMENDATION 1
Clarify China’s strategic military capabilities and
promote nonproliferation and arms control measures
that limit strategic weapons in Asia. Most current
nuclear arms control initiatives (e.g., the Limited Test
Ban Treaty [LTBT], the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty [CTBT], the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
[FMCT], limits on missile defenses, Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks [SALT], Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty [START], and Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty [INF]) were originally designed to limit
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arms competitions between the United States and
Russia. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
was initially designed to reduce the prospects of
nuclear proliferation mostly in Europe. As the world’s
economic and strategic center of gravity shifts toward
Asia, though, it would make sense to tailor more of our
control efforts toward this region.
Wither Beijing?
This means, first, clarifying China’s strategic capabilities. Beijing’s revelations that it has built 3,000 miles
of deep tunnels to protect and hide its dual-capable
missiles and related nuclear warhead systems, suggest
the need to reassess estimates of China’s nuclear-capable missile and nuclear weapons holdings and plans.
Are Beijing’s revelations disinformation designed to
intimidate? Is it hiding more military assets than we
currently assess it has? What is it planning to acquire
and deploy? How much military fissile material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—does
China currently have on hand? How likely is it that
China has or will militarize or expand its fissile material holdings? How might China militarize its civilian
nuclear infrastructure? How many different types of
nuclear weapons does it have or intend to deploy?
How much fissile material does each type require?
How many missile reloads does China currently have;
how many is it planning to acquire? How extensive
are Chinese deployments of multiple warheads for
the country’s missiles, and how much further might
China expand these deployments? For which missile
types and in what numbers? How many nuclear and
advanced conventional warheads is China deploying
on its missiles, bombers, submarines, and artillery?
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What are its plans for using these forces? How might
these plans relate to China’s emerging space, missile
defense, and anti-satellite capabilities? All of these
questions, and more, deserve review within the U.S.
Government, with America’s allies, and, to the extent
possible, in cooperation with India, Russia, as well as
China itself.
As a part of this review, it also would be helpful
to game alternative war and military crisis scenarios
that feature China’s possible use of these forces. These
games should be conducted at senior political levels
in American and allied governments. Conducting
such games should also inform U.S. and allied arms
control policies and military planning. With regard
to the latter, a key focus would have to be how one
might defend, deter, and limit the damage that Chinese nuclear and nonnuclear missile systems might
otherwise inflict against the United States, its bases in
the Western Pacific, America’s friends and allies, and
Russia.
This could entail not only the further development
and deployment of active missile defenses, but also
of better passive defenses (e.g., base hardening and
improving the capacity to restore operations at bases
after attacks; hardened command, control, and communication systems; etc.) and possibly new offensive
forces—more capable, long-range conventional strike
systems to help neutralize possible offensive Chinese
operations.
Yet another focus for such gaming would be to
clarify the likely consequences of Japanese or South
Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons. These games
should be held routinely, bilaterally, and multilaterally with our allies and friends and, at times, with
all of the key states, including China, represented by
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informed experts and officials. The aim of such games
would not only be to understand just how risky Japanese and South Korean nuclear proliferation might be,
but to clarify the risks China and North Korea will run
if they continue to build up their missile and nuclear
forces.
Controlling Nuclear Missiles
Such gaming should also encourage a review of
Washington’s current arms control agenda. Here several specific ideas, which are particularly relevant to
Asia, deserve attention. First among these is talks with
China, Russia, and other states about limiting groundbased, dual-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. China
possesses more of these systems than any other state.
Counting American, Russian, Indian, Pakistani, North
Korean, South Korean, and Chinese ground-based
missiles, Asia is targeted by more such missiles than
any other region.
Unlike air- and sea-based missiles, groundlaunched systems can be securely communicated with
and fired instantly upon command. As such, they are
ideal for use in a first strike. These accurate, dual-capable missiles also can inflict strategic harm against
major bases and naval operations when carrying conventional warheads.
Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan referred to
these weapons as “nuclear missiles,” and looked forward to their eventual elimination. Toward this end,
he concluded the INF Treaty agreement, which eliminated an entire class of ground-based nuclear-capable
missiles, and negotiated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was designed to block the
further proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles (i.e.,
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rockets and unmanned air-breathing systems capable
of lifting over 500 kilograms for a distance of at least
300 kilometers). With the promotion of space-based
missile defenses, President Reagan hoped to eliminate
enough of such ground-based missiles to eliminate
credible nuclear first strike threats.2
Which states have an incentive to eliminate these
missiles? The United States eliminated all of its intermediate ground-launched missiles under the INF
Treaty. Most of America’s shorter-range missiles
are either air-launched or below MTCR range-payload limits. As for U.S. ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), they are all based in
fixed silos. To avoid being knocked out in any major
future nuclear exchange, these missiles may have to be
launched on warning. Russia, on the other hand, has a
large, road-mobile ICBM force. At the same time, it is
worried about growing numbers of long-range, precision missiles that both the United States and China are
developing against which it cannot easily defend.3
India and Pakistan have ground-launched ballistic missiles, but some of their most seasoned military
experts have called for the elimination of short-range
missiles, arguing that these weapons are only likely to
escalate border disputes.4 As for China, it has much
to gain by deploying more ground-launched missiles, unless, of course, such deployment causes India,
Russia, and the United States to react militarily. The
United States has been developing hypersonic boost
glide systems that could provide it with prompt global
strike options. It could base these systems either in the
continental United States or in forward bases in the
Western Pacific.5 It also has hundreds of silo-based
ICBMs that it could convert to deliver advanced nonnuclear payloads, including hypersonic boost glide
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systems.6 Provoking an uncontrolled competition
on the development of these weapons between the
United States, China, and Russia would not be in anyone’s long-term interest. Talks about reducing longrange, nuclear-capable ground-based missile systems
and preventing the further spread of advanced missile
technologies (e.g., hypersonic boost glide technology7)
to other states should be explored.8
Limiting Forward Nuclear Deployments
Another arms restriction that should be considered is keeping the world’s nuclear-armed states from
deploying any additional nuclear weapons in peacetime on the soil of states that lack such weapons. An
immediate concern is Saudi Arabia, rumored to be
interested in buying nuclear weapons either from
China or Pakistan, or in getting either nation to deploy
several of their warheads there. Under the NPT, it is
permissible for nuclear weapons states to deploy their
weapons in states that lack such weapons so long as
these weapons stay under the “control” of the donor
nuclear weapons state. This provision in the NPT
was crafted in the 1960s to allow the United States to
continue to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and
East Asia, and for the Soviet Union to do so in Warsaw
Pact countries.
Although the United States continues to forward
base some of its weapons in Europe, long-range
bombers and missile systems have made it possible
to remove all of the forward deployed U.S. tactical
nuclear systems from East Asia. Given that Washington is unlikely to reintroduce them or to increase existing deployments, it may be possible to broker some
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understanding to forbid any further deployments in
exchange for Chinese and Pakistani pledges not to
deploy any of their nuclear arms beyond their soil.
With the turmoil in the Persian Gulf region, brokering such an understanding would be timely. It
also would have the immediate advantage of engaging Pakistan, a non-NPT member, in some form of
nuclear arms restraint. This is something that should
be encouraged more generally with nuclear weapons-armed non-NPT members. Pakistan recently
announced its willingness to forgo nuclear testing unilaterally.9 Given Pakistan’s rivalry with India, perhaps
New Delhi could be persuaded to consider adopting
such limits as well. Beyond this, other limits, including on nuclear fissile production, might be sought by
not only Pakistan and India, but Israel as well. In this
manner, one could begin to view states that are now
outside the NPT as being instead potential NPT members in noncompliance—i.e., as states, which by taking
steps toward nuclear restraint, might improve their
current noncompliant NPT status. Additional nuclear
restraints ought also to be promoted among the
nuclear weapons armed states. Although, there is no
clear legally binding obligation for the nuclear-armed
states to disarm, the NPT encourages all states to make
good faith efforts to do so.10
Fissile Limits, Starting with China
If the United States could get other states to reduce
their nuclear weapons capabilities in a verifiable fashion, it should be open to continuing to do so. Reaching
new treaty agreements, though, ought not to be the
only measure of progress. Although it may not be possible to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty anytime
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soon, all of the other permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) should press China
to follow their lead in unilaterally forswearing making
fissile material for weapons. This, in turn, could be
helpful in pressing for moratoriums on “peaceful”
nuclear fuel making of uneconomical nuclear weapons-usable fuels as well.11
In this regard, an informal pause on the commercial production, stockpiling, and recycling of plutonium would make sense. A good place to begin would
be in East Asia and the Pacific, starting with China,
the United States, Japan, and South Korea.12 Here, it is
worth noting that the 2012 report of the U.S. Blue Ribbon
Commission on America’s Nuclear Future determined
that dry cask storage would make more economic
sense for the United States to pursue in the management of waste and economic production of nuclear
electricity than commercial plutonium recycling in the
near and mid-term.13 Meanwhile, America’s efforts to
convert weapons plutonium into commercial mixed
oxide fuel (MOX) are likely to be terminated.14 As for
Japan’s planned plutonium reprocessing and fast reactor programs, Tokyo will have trouble implementing
them given its reduced reliance on nuclear power and
its termination of its only demonstration sized breeder
at Monju. South Korea wants to recycle plutonium in
a prototype integrated fast reactor, but this program
may well get pushed back considerably. Its planned
first fuel loading will be low-enriched uranium (LEU),
not plutonium-based fuel.15
China is working with AREVA to build a commercial reprocessing plant nearly identical to the
Rokkasho plant in Japan. A sticking point, though, is
siting. So far, Beijing has been unable to select a site
its public can accept. According to nuclear analysts,
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Beijing might build this large commercial reprocessing
plant by 2030, have it separate plutonium for 10 to 20
years, and stockpile this material to fuel a fleet of commercial breeder reactors.16 This view, in turn, is driven
by the expectation that uranium yellowcake will be
unavailable after 2050 for anything less than US$130
(current) per pound (i.e., 300 percent more than the
price today).17
This uranium price projection is speculative and
rebuttable. What is not is the potential military utility of
China’s civilian plutonium program. As already noted,
the commercial-sized reprocessing plant the Chinese
nuclear establishment may decide to build could produce enough plutonium for roughly 1,500 first-generation bombs annually. Assuming China’s first breeder
reactor came online by 2040, its first fueling with plutonium would come only after China had amassed well
over 15,000 weapons’ worth of plutonium.
Of course, if any of the three East Asian states begins
to reprocess plutonium commercially, the other two
would almost certainly follow, as much as a security
hedge against each other as for any civilian purpose.
At a minimum, the United States, France, and Russia
should refrain from promoting reprocessing and large
fast reactors in the region.18 For similar reasons, China,
Japan, and South Korea are each interested in significantly expanding their capacity to enrich uranium even
though there is a surfeit of uranium enrichment capacity worldwide. South Korea also is interested in developing naval reactors, which would require enriched
uranium fuel.19 This raises the question of how naval
reactor fuels might be inspected and controlled by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), not
just in South Korea but also in Brazil, Iran, and Pakistan―states that have also expressed an interest in
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developing naval reactors.20 To head this off, it would
be helpful to call for a freeze on the deployment of any
additional commercial uranium enrichment capacity
in China, Japan, and South Korea (and North Korea, if
possible).21
As already noted, the United States and Russia
maintain surplus nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials stockpiles, and India, Israel, Pakistan,
China, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom hold
significant amounts of nuclear explosive plutonium
and uranium. This fissile material overhang increases
security uncertainties as to how many nuclear weapons these states might have or could fashion relatively
quickly. Given the verification difficulties with a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty and the improbabilities of such a treaty being brought into force, it would
be useful to consider control alternatives.22
One idea, backed by several analysts and former
officials, is a voluntary initiative known as the Fissile
Material Control Initiative (FMCI).23 It would call on
nuclear weapons-usable material producing states to
set aside whatever fissile materials they have in excess
of their immediate military or civilian requirements
for either final disposition or internationally verified safekeeping. Russia and the United States have
already agreed to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade
plutonium, and have blended down 683 tons of weapons-grade uranium for use in civilian reactors. Much
more could be done to dispose of, and end production
of, such weapons-usable nuclear materials, not only
in the United States and Russia, but also in other fissile-producing states, including those in Asia.24
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RECOMMENDATION 2
Encourage nuclear supplier states to condition
their further export of civilian nuclear plants upon
the recipients forswearing reprocessing spent reactor
fuel and enriching uranium and press the IAEA to be
more candid about what it can safeguard. Will Iran’s
pursuit of “peaceful” nuclear energy serve as a model
for Saudi Arabia (which says it wants to build 16 large
power reactors before 2035), Turkey (which says it
plans to build 20), Egypt (4), and Algeria (3)? When
asked, none of these countries’ officials has been willing to forgo making nuclear fuel. So far, only Turkey
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have ratified the
IAEA’s tougher nuclear inspection regime under the
Additional Protocol. There also is the outstanding issue
of whether the United States will eventually authorize
South Korea to recycle U.S.-origin nuclear materials.
All of this should be a worry, since, as already noted,
the IAEA cannot find covert enrichment or reprocessing facilities or reactor plants with much confidence
(compare to recent history regarding nuclear plants in
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria). Once a large reactor
operates in a country, fresh LEU becomes available and
raises the possibility that it could be seized for possible further enrichment to weapons grade in a covert or
declared enrichment plant. Alternatively, the reactor’s
plutonium-laden spent fuel could be reprocessed to
produce many bombs’ worth of plutonium. Unfortunately, IAEA inspections at declared commercial-sized
uranium hexafluoride and enrichment plants, plutonium separation facilities, and plutonium fuel production plants could lose track of several scores of bombs’
worth of nuclear explosive material annually.
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The Gold Standard
Given these points and recognizing that the authority to inspect anywhere at any time without notice is
not yet available to the IAEA (even when it operates
under the Additional Protocol), any state’s pledge not
to conduct reprocessing or enrichment could not be
fully verified in a timely manner. Still, securing such
a legal pledge would have some value: it would put
a violating country on the wrong side of international
law if or when it was found out, and would make
such action sanctionable. This may not be as much as
one wants or needs, but it is far more of a deterrent to
nuclear misbehavior than what current nonproliferation limits afford.
Other than the United States, no nuclear supplier
state (i.e., Russia, France, Japan, China, or South Korea)
has yet required any of its prospective customers to
foreswear enriching uranium or reprocessing spent
fuel to extract plutonium, or committing to ratify the
Additional Protocol. It is unclear how far the United
States will push states to do so (i.e., demanding what
is called the nonproliferation gold standard for civil
nuclear cooperation agreements).25
There is some support in the U.S. Congress for
making it more difficult to finalize any future U.S.
nuclear cooperative agreements with nonnuclear
weapons states like Saudi Arabia unless they agree to
the U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperative conditions.26 These
congressional representatives believe that by taking
the lead on imposing such nonproliferation conditions,
the United States would be in a much better position to
persuade other nuclear supplier states to do the same.
With the Japanese and South Koreans, close U.S.
nuclear cooperation and security guarantees could be
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leveraged to secure these countries’ agreement to such
conditions on their nuclear exports. They and the Chinese want to export reactors based on U.S. designs. It
is unclear whether they can do so legally to states that
do not have a nuclear cooperative agreement with the
United States. China, meanwhile, needs all the help it
can get from the United States to complete the Westinghouse-designed reactors it is building and the Chinese variant on which it is basing much of its nuclear
future. Moreover, France may have difficulty exporting reactors without significant Asian support.27 With
Russia as well as China, the United States should be
more candid about the safety issues that the construction and operation of their reactors present and offer to
renew or expand nuclear cooperation to help resolve
these concerns in exchange for upgrading the nonproliferation conditions on these countries’ nuclear
exports.28 Finally, the United States should approach
URENCO about requiring recipients of uranium
exports not to enrich or reprocess these materials without URENCO’s consent.
Timely Detection
It also would be helpful if the IAEA was more
honest about what kinds of nuclear activities and
material holdings it can actually safeguard effectively—i.e., which ones it can inspect so as to detect military diversions in a timely fashion and which ones it
cannot. As it is, the IAEA is unwilling to make public
its assessments of the agency’s ability to meet its own
timeliness detection goals (which are hardly strict).
Meanwhile, no state, including the United States, has
yet done such an assessment of the effectiveness of the
agency’s safeguards.29
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In the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when only a
handful of states lacking nuclear weapons were interested in enriching uranium or separating plutonium
from spent reactor fuel, this lax approach may have
been tolerable. Today, however, Japan, South Korea,
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Vietnam, and Jordan are all either making
enriched uranium, reprocessing spent reactor fuels, or
reserving their “right” to do so. All of these states are
members of the NPT and have pledged not to acquire
nuclear weapons. Should we assume that none of
them would ever cheat? What confidence should we
have that the IAEA would be able to detect possible
diversions early enough for the other NPT members
to intervene to prevent them from producing nuclear
weapons?
Currently, the IAEA’s own nuclear safeguard
guidelines set routine inspection intervals to approximate the time the agency estimates is needed to convert certain special nuclear materials into bomb cores.
The IAEA’s ability to verify production figures at
large uranium hexafluoride (reprocessing, uranium
enrichment, and plutonium and mixed oxide fuel fabrication) plants though, is limited. Not only does the
agency have difficulty detecting abrupt diversions in
a timely fashion (i.e., it may only be able to learn of
diversions after they have occurred), but the margins
of error associated with the IAEA’s ability to detect
small, incremental diversions are equivalent to many
bombs’ worth every year. In either case, once a state
has enough fissile material to make a bomb, it could
break out well before the IAEA or other states could
intervene to prevent nuclear weapons from being built.
These facts are troubling. What makes them doubly
so is that the IAEA has yet to share these specifics
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publicly in any detail. Worse, it continues to claim that
it can safeguard these materials and plants (i.e., provide “timely detection” of possible military nuclear
diversions), when, in fact, in many cases, it cannot.
It is essential that inspectors and diplomats distinguish between what inspectors can merely monitor
(i.e., inspect to provide confidence that major diversions have not taken place sometime in the past) from
what they can actually safeguard (i.e., inspect to assure
detection of military diversions early enough so outside parties have sufficient time to block actual bomb
making). If this distinction were made clear, governments could fully appreciate and, perhaps restrict,
nuclear activities and holdings that are not able to be
safeguarded and hence are dangerous.30 This, in turn,
would make promoting tougher nonproliferation standards, like the Gold Standard, much easier.
RECOMMENDATION 3
Anticipate and ward off nuclear proliferation
developments before recognized redlines have been
clearly violated. One of the regrettable legacies of the
Cold War is the habit U.S. and allied government officials have acquired of waiting for irrefutable evidence
of undesirable, foreign nuclear weapons developments
before taking action. This must change.
After the Soviet Union first acquired nuclear weapons in 1949, the West’s aim in competing against it was
not so much to prevent Russia from acquiring more
strategic weapons as it was to prevent it from gaining
strategic superiority. For this purpose, it was sufficient
that Western military forces remained more modern
and sufficiently numerous to deter Soviet offensive
capabilities—i.e., that Russia’s strategic technology
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stayed roughly one or more generations behind ours
so that its strategic deployments could never change
the relative balance of power. If Russia deployed a new
strategic nuclear rocket, Washington would focus on
what the Soviets had built and build a bigger or better
U.S. version, or develop some new passive or active
defenses, or build counter offensive forces that could
neutralize the new Soviet weapon system.
After the United States and Russia ratified a number
of strategic arms limitation agreements, any Russian
strategic nuclear deployment that exceeded agreed
limits became a matter for diplomatic adjudication. In
either case, U.S. or allied action turned on detecting
and verifying the violation of agreed or implicit redlines. Fortunately, in this competition, the Soviets ultimately failed to keep up with the United States and its
allies. Moscow’s failed attempts to do so only helped
bankrupt it financially and politically.31
Competitive Strategies
That was the Cold War. In our current efforts to
prevent horizontal proliferation, the objective is quite
different. Instead of merely trying to stay ahead of a
proliferating state militarily, our aim must be to prevent
it from acquiring certain weapons altogether. Being
able to detect states’ possible violations of pledges not
to acquire these weapons is necessary.
The problem is that verifying such detections is
much more awkward than detecting and verifying
Soviet strategic weapons developments. Whereas
detecting Soviet arms developments was often deemed
an intelligence success and frequently prompted policy
or military actions, detecting nuclear proliferation
today is bad news—it only confirms that our nuclear

124

nonproliferation policies have failed. More often than
not, by the time one verifies a nonproliferation violation, it is too late to roll it back unless one takes relatively extreme diplomatic or military measures. It is not
surprising, then, that in more than a few proliferation
cases—e.g., with Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, South
Africa, and India—U.S. officials often averted their
gaze from, denied, or downplayed intelligence that
these states had acquired or tested nuclear weapons.32
In some cases, though, the United States and its
allies succeeded in preventing nuclear proliferation.
The most prominent cases included getting Taiwan,
South Korea, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine,
and Libya to give up their nuclear weapons programs.
In these cases, the United States and its allies had a
long-term regimen of nonproliferation sanctions and
export controls in place well before the state in question ever acquired nuclear weapons (e.g., in the cases
of Libya and South Africa) or acted well before there
was clear proof that nuclear weapons were in hand
or were going to be retained (e.g., with Taiwan, South
Africa, South Korea, and Ukraine).33
What these and other less well-known nonproliferation successes suggest is the desirability of creating long-term, country-specific strategies that initially
eschew dramatic actions. These strategies could be
developed along several lines. In the case of Libya and
South Africa, the West relied heavily on long-term,
bureaucratically institutionalized economic sanctions and export controls as well as a vigilant proliferation intelligence watch on each country’s nuclear
weapons-related programs and timely political
interventions.
An even more aggressive approach would create a
set of tailored competitive strategies that would work
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backward from the nuclear futures that U.S. officials
wanted to avoid and toward futures they thought
were better. The aim here would be to set a series of
mid-term (i.e., 10-20 year) goals that would drive and
guide our diplomatic, economic, military, and intelligence efforts to shape more peaceful futures.34 Rather
than wait to act until there is proof of a nuclear weapons program, officials would act earlier, taking modest
steps to ward off incipient nuclear weapons programs
or to support positive policies that might reduce the
targeted state’s interest in initiating such programs in
the first place.35
Hardheaded Internationalism
An integral part of working such competitive strategies would be a willingness to promote the kinds of
nonproliferation and arms control proposals noted
above. This would require a hardheaded kind of
internationalism. In the 1960s and 1970s, when U.S.
and allied arms control policies were premised upon
finite deterrence—i.e., on the evils of targeting weapons and defending against them, and on the practical
advantages of holding innocents at risk in the world’s
major cities—arms control rightly became an object of
derision by serious security planners.36 Since then, it
almost has become an article of conservative, Republican faith that arms control is self-defeating. Most
liberal Democrats, on the other hand, believe that it
deserves unquestioned support.37
Any serious effort to reduce future nuclear threats
will need to move beyond this ideological divide. Certainly, any nuclear threat reduction effort that supports U.S. and allied aims will be difficult to sustain
unless it complements some larger diplomatic effort.
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The best way to start would be to put our Cold War
fascination with mutual assured destruction theorizing aside and focus instead on what is most likely to
reduce the chances of war, nuclear proliferation, and
nuclear weapons use.38
International law also has become increasingly stylized to restrain states from taking military action. Its
practical impact, however, has been to restrain those
states least likely to take such action even when such
action is called for. As a result, international law has
lost its standing among many of those most concerned
about the safety and security of their country. To be
sure, there are limits to what any international legal
structure can achieve without the backing of sovereign
military power.39 In the past, international law and the
promotion of justifiable sovereign power were seen as
being mutually supportive. We need to get back to this
earlier understanding. Like maintaining peace, this is
neither hopeless nor automatic.40
In any effort to return to this view, the given suggestions are a reasonable place to begin. It is clearly
desirable to reduce the number of nuclear weapons,
the amount of nuclear weapons-usable materials,
the number of plants that make them, the number of
long-range nuclear-capable missiles, and the number
of states possessing these nuclear assets. It may be
imprudent to make such cuts unilaterally or without
effective verification, but we should be clear about our
willingness to compete militarily and diplomatically to
realize such reductions in a manner that avoids such
risks. Indeed, on this last point, there should be no hesitation. Less, in this case, would be better.
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THINKING AHEAD
Recently, a friend and former senior official under
three Presidents (both Republican and Democratic)
quipped that with most nuclear weapons proliferation problems, officials initially are loath to act because
they believe there is no clear problem, and then, when
they finally are convinced that the problem is real, they
insist there is no solution. This is a pathology for inaction. It also is unnecessary. In fact, some of the toughest nuclear proliferation problems can be neutralized
well before they are fully realized, and, in key cases,
have been.
From 2013 through 2015, I held a series of workshops on alternative nuclear futures in East Asia. These
meetings, which included Chinese, Korean, Japanese,
U.S., and Russian security and energy experts and officials, focused on how each country would react if they
or their neighbors either acquired nuclear weapons or
ramped up the number of nuclear arms they already
had. First, I was warned that no one would attend.
Then, I was told that if they did come, no one would
speak. Finally, I was advised, if they spoke, they would
not get along. All of these predictions proved to be mistaken. Instead, there were candid Chinese and Korean
exchanges about Japan’s stockpiling of plutonium and
Japanese and Russian anxieties expressed about the
opacity of China’s nuclear weapons program. There
was a problem, though: all of the participants, including government officials from each state (including the
United States), confided in me that the discussions we
were having could never be conducted by or within
each of their respective governments—the topics
simply were too sensitive.
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This is bad enough. Yet, the challenge of working
difficult security issues (including nuclear weapons
proliferation) runs even deeper. Operating outside
of government, one has the freedom not only to be
vocal, but consistent (two things that are difficult to
do while in office). Yet, exercising this freedom often
draws criticism from those in or close to power as
being dangerously radical or impractical. There is no
easy response to this. One strong possibility, however,
is that too many government officials are failing to do
their jobs while too few analysts outside government
are pointing this out. There is, after all, a strong temptation (particularly among officials who are ambitious
or eager to please) to avoid issues that, if mishandled,
could result in catastrophe (either for themselves or
for others). Those outside of government who wish to
maintain and expand their network of contacts share
such caution.
Giving in to this temptation, however, risks backing into and compounding our most serious, avoidable
problems. Thus, the nuclear crisis in Iran was made
worse by more than 20 years of inattention and consistent downplaying of the risks Iran’s program posed.
When U.S. officials finally began to focus in the early
2000s on the Iranian nuclear threat, Iran’s nuclear program had become so mature and intractable that the
available responses were limited either to acts of war
or diplomatic backsliding. Not surprisingly, this only
encouraged an unhealthy political polarization over
the issue.41
With nuclear weapons proliferation, these pitfalls
can be avoided, but only if those in and outside of
government focus on proliferation problems earlier
and more seriously than they have to date. Of course,
some will protest that we can ill afford to concentrate
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on anything but the most pressing nuclear crises—
whether it be North Korea, Iran, or our relations with
Moscow. “Solving” these matters, it is argued, is imperative to avoid immediate and certain nuclear disaster
and, therefore, to assure nuclear restraint and peace for
the long haul. Perhaps; any honest assessment would
suggest that our most urgent problems no longer allow
for any simple solutions. If so, our optimism and hopes
would be better directed more toward futures we can
shape now than on correcting present crises our past
neglect has all but determined.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. See Jenna Johnson and Anton Troianovski, “Trump congratulates Putin on his reelection, discusses U.S.-Russian ‘arms
race’,” The Washington Post, March 20, 2018, available from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trump-congratulates-putinon-his-reelection-kremlin-says/2018/03/20/379effd0-2c57-11e8-8dc93b51e028b845_story.html?utm_term=.41bd0e2c363.
2. See Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, Reagan’s
Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from
Nuclear Disaster, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009.
3. See Jacob W. Kipp, “Asian Drivers of Russian Nuclear
Force Posture,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2012, pp. 45-82, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/
display.cfm?pubID=1113; and “US Concerned by China’s New
Hypersonic Missile,” The Voice of Russia, January 29, 2014, available from http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2014_01_29/
US-concerned-by-Chinas-new-hypersonic-missile-1459/.
4. See R. N. Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South
Asia,” in Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race, pp. 305-356; Feroz
Hassan Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control,” in Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race, pp. 357-386; and David
Sanger, “U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” The New York Times, October 15, 2015, available from http://

130

www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/asia/us-exploring-deal-to-limitpakistans-nuclear-arsenal.html?_r=0.
5. See Timothy Walton, “Why We Need the Advanced
Hypersonic Weapon,” War on the Rocks (blog), June
9, 2014, available from http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/
why-we-need-advanced-hypersonic-weapon/.
6. Neither of these options would violate the INF Treaty,
which does not cover hypersonic boost glide intercontinental systems. See Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Pentagon goes hypersonic
with long-range rapid attack weapon,” The Washington Times,
March 19, 2014, available from http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2014/mar/19/inside-the-ring-pentagon-goes-hypersonic-withlong/?page=all. Other options that have been discussed would
violate the INF Treaty. See Barry D. Watts, Long-Range Strike:
Imperatives, Urgency and Options, Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 2005, pp. 62-68, available from http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/R.20050406.LRPS.pdf.
7. For a fuller discussion, see Richard H. Speier, George
Nacouzi, Carrie Lee, and Richard M. Moore, Hypersonic Missile
Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons,
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017, available from https://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html. See also Richard H.
Speier, K. Scott McMahon, and George Nacouzi, Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic
Missile Defenses, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014,
available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR378.
html#recommendations; and Henry Sokolski, “Missiles for Peace,”
Armed Forces Journal, July 2010, available from http://www.npolicy.
org/article_file/Missiles_for_peace-With_strong_conventional_strike_
options_the_US_can_lessen_nuclear_threats.pdf. Also listen to the
audio of a panel discussion, “Missiles for Peace,” held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC,
September 13, 2010, available from http://d2tjk9wifu2pr3.cloudfront.net/2010-09-13-Sokolski.mp3. Also see Rachel Oswald, “Russian Expert Urges Multilateral Ban on Ground-Based Strategic
Missiles,” Global Security Newswire, February 13, 2014, available
from
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russian-expert-advises-gettingrid-icbms-encourage-multilateral-arms-control/?utm_source=dlvr.
it&utm_medium=twitter.

131

8. Yet another aerospace control topic for possible negotiations (especially with the Chinese) is how to limit the emerging
space “stalker” satellite threat to prevent possible space “Pearl
Harbor” attacks against key military space assets. See Brian G.
Chow, “Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat,” Strategic Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2017, pp. 82-116, available from
http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume11_Issue-2/Chow.pdf.
9. “Have declared unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing: Pakistan,” The Indian Express, December 16, 2016, available
from http://indianexpress.com/article/world/have-declared-unilateralmoratorium-on-nuclear-testing-pakistan-4430382/.
10. On the hortatory (vice legally binding) character of the NPT
Article VI call for disarmament, see Christopher A. Ford, “Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 14, No. 3, November 2007, pp. 401-428, available from http://
cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/143ford.pdf; and compare to Henry Sokolski
and Victor Gilinsky, “Serious Rules for Nuclear Power without
Proliferation,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense:
Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, pp. 457-499, available
from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1204.
11. For the latest discussion of the need to reduce states’
production and stockpiles of civilian and military nuclear weapons-usable fuels, see Harold A. Feiveson et al., Unmaking the Bomb:
A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014, pp. 172-183.
12. See Brad Sherman, Jeff Fortenberry, and Adam Schiff,
“Letter to President [Obama] Regarding the Production of Fissile
Material in East Asia,” June 10, 2016, available from http://www.
npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1317&rtid=4.
13. See Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear
Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC: Blue
Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, January 2012,
pp. xii, xiv, 30, 98, 112, 118, available from energy.gov/sites/prod/
files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.

132

14. See Jeremy Dillon, “Senate Energy-Water Bill Advanced
Amid Nuclear Weapons Debate,” Roll Call, May 24, 2018, available
from https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/energy-water-bill-senate.
15. See “Japan official calls for scrapping of troubled Monju
reactor,” CBC News, September 20, 2016, available from http://
www.cbc.ca/beta/news/technology/japan-monju-reactor-1.3770197;
and Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Miles Pomper, Stephanie Lieggi,
Charles McCombie, and Neil Chapman, “Rethinking Spent Fuel
Management in South Korea,” Occasional Paper No. 16, Monterey, CA: Center for the Nonproliferation Studies, 2013, pp.
23-25, 37-50, available from http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/130301_
korean_alternatives_report.pdf.
16. On the Chinese protests against the possible construction
of this plant at Lianyungang, a city in Jiangsu Province, see Chris
Buckley, “Thousands in Eastern Chinese City Protest Nuclear
Waste Project,” The New York Times, August 8, 2016, available
from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/world/asia/china-nuclearwaste-protest-lianyungang.html; and Brian Spegele, “China Looks
to Placate Nuclear-Project Protesters,” The Wall Street Journal,
August 10, 2016, available from http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinacracks-down-on-nuclear-project-protests-1470734568. The 2030 date
was recently confirmed by The World Nuclear Association. See
“Nuclear growth revealed in China’s new Five-Year Plan,” World
Nuclear News, March 23, 2016, available from http://www.worldnuclear-news.org/NP-Nuclear-plans-revealed-in-Chinas-new-FiveYear-Plan-2303166.html.
17. See Zhongmao Gu, “Envision of Nuclear Energy and
Fuel Cycle Development in China,” February 27, 2014, presentation at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Alternative East Asian Nuclear Futures conference held February 25-27,
2014, in Honolulu, HI, available from http://npolicy.org/article.
php?aid=1257&rid=2.
18. On this last point, see Victor Gilinsky and Henry
Sokolski, “How France is Fueling Japan and China’s Nuclear
‘Race’,” The National Interest, November 6, 2015, available
from
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-france-fueling-japanchina%E2%80%99s-nuclear-race-14271; and Henry Sokolski, “Can
East Asia Avoid a Nuclear Explosive Materials Arms Race?”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 28, 2016, available from

133

http://thebulletin.org/can-east-asia-avoid-nuclear-explosive-materialsarms-race9295.
19. See Jeff Jeong, “South Korea eyes French design for
indigenous nuclear sub, sources say,” Defense News, March
28, 2018, available from https://www.defensenews.com/industry/
techwatch/2018/03/28/south-korea-eyes-french-design-for-indigenousnuclear-sub-sources-say/; and Zachary Keck and Henry Sokolski, “South Korea Is about to Make a $7 Billion Nuclear
Submarine Blunder,” The National Interest, September 30,
2017, available from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
south-korea-about-make-7-billion-nuclear-submarine-blunder-22540.
20. On Brazil’s interest in a nuclear submarine program,
see Matias Spektor, “Prospects for Safe-Guarding Brazil’s
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program,” FAS Issue Brief, August
2017, available from https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/
Prospects-for-Safeguarding-Brazil%E2%80%99s-Naval-NuclearPropulsion-Program.pdf. On Iran, see Callum Paton, “Iran Plans
Nuclear Submarines in Defiance of U.S. and Trump’s Warnings,” Newsweek, February 23, 2018, available from http://www.
newsweek.com/iran-plans-nuclear-submarines-defiance-us-andtrumps-warnings-817525. On Pakistan, see “Pakistan: Navy Plans
to Design Own Nuclear-Powered Submarine,” Naval Today, February 16, 2012, available from https://navaltoday.com/2012/02/16/
pakistan-navy-plans-to-design-own-nuclear-powered-submarine/. On
the naval reactor loophole in the NPT, see Jeffrey M. Kaplow,
“NPT’S Naval Nuclear Propulsion Loophole,” in Henry Sokolski,
ed., Nuclear Rules, Not Just Rights: The NPT Reexamined, Arlington,
VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2017, pp. 123-153,
available from http://npolicy.org/books/Nuclear_Rules_Not_Just_
Rights/Ch4_Kaplow.pdf.
21. Frank von Hippel, Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycles in Northeast Asia, paper presented at the Panel on Peace and Security of
North East Asia, Nagasaki, Japan, November 20, 2016, available
from http://npolicy.org/article_file/Civilian%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20
Cycles%20in%20NE%20Asia%2028Oct2016%20%28rev.%202%29.
pdf.
22. See Christopher A. Ford, “Five Plus Three: How to Have
a Meaningful and Helpful Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,” Arms
Control Today, March 2009; and Christopher A. Ford, “The United

134

States and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,” paper presented to
the “Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right” conference,
Annecy, France, March 17, 2007, available from https://2001-2009.
state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/81950.htm.
23. For the earliest presentation of this concept, see Brian G.
Chow, Richard H. Speier, and Gregory S. Jones, A Concept for Strategic Material Accelerated Removal Talks (SMART), DRU-1338-DoE,
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, April 1996, available from
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU1338.
pdf. Also see Robert J. Einhorn, “Controlling Fissile Materials and
Ending Nuclear Testing,” presented at an international conference on nuclear disarmament, “Achieving the Vision of a World
Free of Nuclear Weapons,” held in Oslo, Norway, February 26-27,
2008, available from http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/
External_Reports/paper-einhorn.pdf.
24. It should also be noted that although China’s and South
Korea’s fast reactor and plutonium recycling plans are ambitious,
they are not yet locked in. China’s fast reactor program is not
yet fully funded. There is money to build pilot facilities, but not
enough to operate them year-round. Nor, as already noted, has
the Chinese Government yet identified a specific construction site
for its planned large commercial-sized reprocessing plant. As for
South Korea’s program, it is still a matter caught up in the implementation of the U.S.-South Korean civilian nuclear cooperative
agreement. See International Panel on Fissile Materials, Plutonium Separation in Nuclear Power Programs, 2015, pp. 19-29, 73-79;
Chris Buckley, “Chinese City Backs Down on Proposed Nuclear
Fuel Plant after Protests,” The New York Times, August 10, 2016,
available from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/world/asia/chinanuclear-fuel-lianyungang.html?_r=0; and endnote 62 in chapter 3 of
this volume.
25. See Rebecca Kheel, “Perry Cites Competition from Russia,
China to Defend Nuclear Talks with Saudis,” The Hill, March 22,
2018, available from http://thehill.com/policy/defense/379744-perry-citescompetition-from-russia-china-to-defend-nuclear-negotiations-with?amp.
26. In May 2018, Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and
Brad Sherman introduced HR 5357, The Nuclear Cooperation
Reform Act of 2018. The bill is available from https://sherman.house.
gov/sites/sherman.house.gov/files/H.R.%205357%20-%20Nuclear%20

135

Cooperation%20Reform%20Act%20of%202018.pdf. For more on
this effort, see Kingston Reif, “U.S.-Saudi Talks Begin on Nuclear
Pact,” Arms Control Association, April 2018, available from https://
www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-04/news/us-saudi-talks-begin-nuclearpact; and the Middle East and North Africa House Subcommittee
hearing, “Implications of a U.S.-Saudi Arabia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement for the Middle East,” held on March 21, 2018, in
the Rayburn House Office building in Washington, DC, video and
witness statements available from https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearing/subcommittee-hearing-implications-u-s-saudi-arabia-nuclearcooperation-agreement-middle-east/.
27. See Energy Collective, “AREVA Struggles to Dig Out of
Debt,” March 25, 2015, available from http://www.theenergycollective.
com/dan-yurman/2208496/areva-struggles-dig-out-debt;
John
Lichfield, “UK Nuclear Strategy Faces Meltdown As Faults Are
Found in Identical French Project,” The Independent, April 18, 2015,
available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/
uk-nuclear-strategy-faces-meltdown-as-faults-are-found-in-identicalfrench-project-10186163.html; Stephen Chen, “French Warnings on
Nuclear Reactors Being Built in China’s Guangdong,” South China
Morning Post, April 15, 2015, available from http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1762861/french-warning-nuclear-reactors-beingbuilt-guangdong; ASN, “Flamanville EPR Reactor Vessel Manufacturing Anomalies,” Press Statement, July 4, 2015, available
from http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/
Flamanville-EPR-reactor-vessel-manufacturing-anomalies;
and
“Japan’s JNFL in Talks on Taking Areva Minority Stake: Source,”
Reuters, December 13, 2016, available from http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-areva-restructuring-idUSKBN14227K.
28. The United States suspended all civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia shortly after it invaded Crimea. China’s civilian nuclear cooperative agreement with the United
States expired in December 2015. On the questionable safety
of Russian and Chinese reactor construction, see Tara Patel
and Benjamin Hass, “China Regulators ‘Overwhelmed’ As
Reactors Built at Pace,” Bloomberg News, June 19, 2014, available from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-18/
french-nuclear-regulator-says-china-cooperation-lacking; “Concerns
over China’s Nuclear Power Expansion,” Chinadialogue,
April 24, 2014, available from https://www.chinadialogue.net/

136

blog/6932-Concerns-over-China-s-nuclear-power-expansion/en; Christina MacPherson, “China’s Nuclear Safety Prospects Are Not
Good,” nuclear-news, October 29, 2013, available from http://
nuclear-news.net/2013/10/29/chinas-nuclear-safety-prospects-are-notgood/; Eve Conant, “Russia’s Nuclear Reactors Could Take Over
the World, Safe or Not,” Scientific American, October 2013, available from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/russias-nuclearreactors-could-take-over-the-world-safe-or-not/; and Quamrul Haider,
“How Safe Are the Russian Civilian Nuclear Reactors?” Daily Star
(Lebanon), June 12, 2013, available from https://www.thedailystar.
net/news/how-safe-are-the-russian-civilian-nuclear-reactors.
29. See Bob Graham, et al., World At Risk: The Report of the
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism,
Washington, DC, December 2, 2008, pp. 49-50, available from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a510559.pdf.
30. See endnote 90 in chapter 3 of this volume; Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski, “Is the IAEA’s Safeguards Strategic
Plan Sufficient?” paper presented at the International Atomic
Energy Agency Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People, October 22, 2014,
Vienna, Austria, available from http://npolicy.org/article_file/
IAEA_Safeguard_Strategic_Plan.pdf; and Trevor Findlay, Proliferation Alert! The IAEA and Noncompliance Reporting, Report No.
2015-04, Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, October 2015, available from http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
proliferationalert-web.pdf.
31. On these points, see Octavian Manea, “Lessons from
Previous Competitive Strategies,” Small Wars Journal, July 6,
2014, available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lessonsfrom-previous-competitive-strategies; and Octavian Manea, “The
Art of Tailoring Competitive Strategies,” Small Wars Journal,
March 24, 2014, available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/
the-art-of-tailoring-competitive-strategies.
32. See Victor Gilinsky, “Sometimes Major Violations of
Nuclear Security Get Ignored,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Nuclear
Materials Gone Missing: What Does History Teach? Arlington, VA:
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2014, available
from
http://www.npolicy.org/books/Materials_Unaccounted_For/
Ch4_Gilinsky.pdf; Robert Zarate, “The Nonuse and Abuse of

137

Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and
Iran,” in Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense, pp. 373-409; and
Leonard Weiss, “The 1979 South Atlantic Flash: The Case for an
Israeli Nuclear Test,” in Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense, pp.
345-371.
33. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson Press, 1995, pp. 90-129; and Eugene Kogan, “Coercing
Allies: Why Friends Abandon Nuclear Plans,” paper presented
at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
Chicago, IL, August 2013, available from http://live.belfercenter.org/
files/kogan-apsa-aug-2013.pdf.
34. See David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Approach
against Proliferation” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a WellArmed World: Devising Competitive Strategies against Weapons Proliferation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 2000, pp. 3-25, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/
pubs/display.cfm?pubID=304; and Henry D. Sokolski, “Nonproliferation: Strategies for Winning, Losing, and Coping,” in Sokolski,
ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World, pp. 51-64; see also Henry
Sokolski, “Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence,” ORBIS, Vol.
38, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 245-260, available from http://fas.org/irp/
threat/fp/b19ch16.htm.
35. For specific examples, see endnote 27 in this chapter and
Henry Sokolski, “Ending South Africa’s Rocket Program: A Nonproliferation Success,” Arlington, VA: Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, August 31, 1993, available from http://www.
npolicy.org/article.php?aid=458&tid=2.
36. Although today there are virtually no respectable, hawkish or hardheaded works on what sorts of nuclear arms control
might be useful; this was not always the case. Thirty or more
years ago before arms control practice became dominated by
mutual assured destruction theorizing, several distinguished
military scientists including Fred Ikle, Albert Wohlstetter, Leon
Sloss, Donald Brennan, and Alain C. Enthoven all believed
unconstrained nuclear competitions and strategic weapons proliferation were less than optimal and seriously considered what
sort of arms control might be practical. See Albert and Roberta
Wohlstetter, “On Arms Control: What We Should Look for in an

138

Arms Agreement,” unpublished draft essay, May 20, 1985, available from the Hoover Institution Archive; Albert and Roberta
Wohlstetter Papers, Notes, Box 118, Folder 16, available in Robert
Zarate and Henry Sokolski, eds., Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 472-500, available
from
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=893;
Albert Wohlstetter and Brian G. Chow, “Arms Control that Could
Work,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1985, available from http://
www.npolicy.org/article_file/Arms_Control_That_Could_Work.pdf;
Fred Charles Iklé, “Nth Countries and Disarmament,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 16, No. 10, December 1960, pp. 391-394,
available from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0096340
2.1960.11454156?journalCode=rbul20#.V2BWToSDGko; Leon Sloss
and M. Scott Davis, eds., A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned
in Negotiating with the Soviet Union, New York: Harper Business, 1986; Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much
Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, New York:
Harper and Rowe Publishers, Inc., 1971; and Donald G. Brennan,
ed., Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, New York:
George Braziller, 1969.
37. Compare to J. Peter Scoblic, US vs. Them: Conservatism in
the Age of Nuclear Terror, New York: Penguin Books, 2009; and John
Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Zero 2012: We Disarm While Others Arm,”
Human Events, September 12, 2012, available from http://human
events.com/2012/09/12/nuclear-zero-2012-we-disarm-while-othersarm/.
38. See Henry D. Sokolski, “Preface,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its
Origins and Practice, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, 2004, pp. v-vi, available from http://ssi.
armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=585; and Henry Sokolski, “Taking Proliferation Seriously,” Policy Review, October and
November 2003, available from http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/
Taking_Proliferation_Seriously-Policy_Review.pdf.
39. See Henry R. Nau, “Conservative Internationalism:
A Smarter Kind of Engagement in World Affairs,” National
Review Online, September 12, 2013, available from https://www.
nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/358318/conservative-internationalism;

139

and Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy
under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2013.
40. Since George F. Kennan’s publication of American Diplomacy, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984, there has been a
popular belief that international law that claims to promote international security is generally at odds with our national security.
However, there are alternative views that could and have guided
U.S. diplomacy and national security policies. Principal among
these is the life work of Elihu Root, U.S. Secretary of State under
President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904,
Nobel Peace Prize winner, founding architect of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, and founder of the American Society of International Law. On his career and advocacy of promoting international laws to promote and protect America’s national
interests, see Erik A. Moore, “Imperial International Law: Elihu
Root and the Legalist Approach to American Empire,” Essays in
History, Vol. 47, 2013, available from http://www.essaysinhistory.
com/imperial-international-law-elihu-root-and-the-legalist-approachto-american-empire/; and Robert E. Hannigan, The New World
Power: American Foreign Policy, 1898-1917, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.
41. See Henry Sokolski, “Ten Regrets: America’s nonproliferation efforts against Iran,” in Joachim Krause, ed., Iran’s Nuclear
Programme: Strategic Implications, London, UK: Routledge, 2012,
pp. 69-83, available from http://npolicy.org/article_file/Ten_RegretsAmericas_Nonproliferation_Efforts_against_Iran.pdf.

140

LIST OF ACRONYMS
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security
Treaty
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DF
Dongfeng, Chinese for “East Wind,” designation for
ballistic missiles
DoD
U.S. Department of Defense
DoE
U.S. Department of Energy
DPRK
North Korea
FAS
Federation of American Scientists
FBR
fast breeder reactor
FMCI
Fissile Material Control Initiative
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
HEU
highly enriched uranium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM
intercontinental ballistic missile
INF
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IPFM
International Panel on Fissile Materials
LEU
Low-enriched Uranium
LTBT
Limited Test Ban Treaty
MIRV
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
MOX
mixed oxide fuel
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NNW
Nonnuclear Weapons
SALT
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIPRI
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM
submarine-launched ballistic missile
START Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
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SWU
UAE

separate work unit
United Arab Emirates

UK
UN
UNSC
URL
WMD

United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Security Council
uniform resource locater
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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